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THE UNITED STATES AcTIoN IN THE
1965 DOMINICAN CRISIS:
IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER-PART II
By VED P. NANDA*
Professor Nanda projects the United States action in the 1965
Dominican crisis against the background of the United Nations and
OAS Charters. He concludes that under contemporary international
law norms, the unilateral use of force in a primarily internal conflict
situation cannot be considered a legitimate self-defense measure.
In a discussion of the relative competence of a regional versus a uni-
versal organization to deal with a regional conflict, Professor Nanda
analyzes the trend toward a greater reliance on the regional organiza-
tion. The Dominican crisis is seen as an attempt to counteract past
trends. To avoid unilateral intervention in internal conflicts, Profes-
sor Nanda recommends the formulation of procedures which will
enable regional and universal organizations, rather than the individ-
ual nation-state, to regulate the use of force.
HE preceding article in this series examined two grounds on
which the United States relied to justify its original dispatch of
Marines during the 1965 Dominican conflict - to protect United
States nationals and to serve humanitarian purposes.'
This article will examine the validity of the United States claim
that forces were sent to prevent a threatened Communist take-over
in the Dominican Republic. It will also discuss the merits of the
United States claim regarding the competence of the OAS vis-a-vis
that of the United Nations to deal with the Dominican crisis.
I. THE PREVENTION OF "ANOTHER CUBA"
The Dominican conflict had hardly entered its second week
when the United States declared that its objective had changed from
the protection of its nationals and other foreigners to the prevention
of a Communist take-over in the Dominican Republic. 2 It therefore
sent more troops to the Dominican Republic, their total number at
one time exceeding 20,000. 3 Subsequently, these troops formed the
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. The author wishes to
acknowledge, with gratitude, the kind assistance of Miss Margaret L. Hayes, Head,
Documents Division, the Denver Public Library; Mrs. Martha S. Peacock, Assistant
Librarian, University of Denver College of Law; and Miss Helen S. Clark of Mary
Reed Library, University of Denver, in making available the necessary documents
and materials.
143 DENVER L.J. 439 (1966).
2 See notes 6-16 infra.
3 See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 912 (1965) (Ambassador Bunker's note to the
Assistant Secretary General of the OAS).
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bulk of the Inter-American Peace Force that was established by the
Organization of American States (OAS) , and the last units of which
stayed in the Dominican Republic until September 1966.
After presenting the official United States position and that of
its critics, the present study will assume the accuracy of the official
United States position for lack of a definitive conclusion on this
controversial but crucial point. Accepting the existence of the threat
of "another Cuba," the paper will test the validity of the United
States action on the principles of international law. The discussion
will center primarily on the treaty obligations of the United States
under the United Nations and the OAS Charter.
A. The Official United States Position
A glance at the views of United States decision-makers will
indicate their preoccupation with the possibility of a Communist con-
trolled Dominican Republic. A meeting at the White House on
April 30 between President Johnson and administration leaders at
the higher policy making echelons, sheds light on the United States'
perception of the danger of a Communist take-over in the Dominican
Republic. One of those leaders present, special presidential envoy
during the Dominican crisis, John Bartlow Martin, reported:
The President said he foresaw two dangers - very soon we would
witness a Castro Communist-dominated government in the Domini-
can Republic, or we would find ourselves in the Republic alone
without any support in the Hemisphere. He didn't want either one
to happen.6
Martin quotes the President as having further said that, while
he had every intention of working for peace through the OAS or any
other channel, he did not intend
to sit here with my hands tied and let Castro take that island. What
can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?
I know what the editorials will say but it would be a hell of a lot
4Id. at 862-3, per Resolution adopted on May 6, 1965, in the Plenary Session of the
Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs by a vote of 15 to 5
with one abstention.
5 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1966, p. 3, col. 1 (city ed.), for a report that the last unit
of the Inter-American Peace Force had left the Dominican Republic on September
21, 1966.
See U.N. Doc. No. S/63'16 (1965), for a letter from the Permanent Representative
of the Soviet Union to the Security Council President requesting him to convene
an "urgent meeting" of the Security Council to consider the question of "armed
interference by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominion Republic."
See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6314 (1965), for the text of a note addressed by the
Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General of the United Nations
denouncing the "illegal action" of the United States and drawing attention to "the
threat to peace which this criminal action entails."
6 MARTIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 661 (1966). Those present at the meeting included
Rusk, Ball, McNamara, General Wheeler and Martin.
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worse if we sit here and don't do anything and the Communists take
that country.7
On May 2, 1965, two days after his arrival in Santo Domingo,
Martin said at a press conference that, in his opinion, the purpose of
the presence of the United States Marines now was or ought to be
"to prevent a Castro/Communist takeover, because what began as a
PRD revolt had in the last few days fallen under the domination of
Castro/Communist and other violent extremists.'8 The same even-
ing, President Johnson declared in a national radio-television broad-
cast that
The revolutionary movement [in the Dominican Republic] took a
a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba...
joined the revolutions. They took increasing control. And what
began as a popular democratic revolution.., very shortly moved
and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a
band of Communist conspirators.9
The President was quite emphatic in his warning that "the American
nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of
another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." 10
Similar statements by Rusk," Stevenson,1
2 Bunker,' 8 Ball,14
Meeker,' " and several members of Congress' 6 were made to the
7 Ibid.
8 MARTIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 676 (1966). See also, Communist Subversion in
The Dominican Crisis (Dep't of State Publication 7971, Inter-American Series 92,
Oct. 19, 1965).
9 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744, 745 (1965).
10 Id. at 746.
11 See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 843-44 (1965), wherein Secretary Rusk stated that,
What began in the Dominion Republic as a democratic revolution was
taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for, and had
carefully planned, that operation. Had they succeeded in establishing a
Sovernment, the Communist seizure of power would in all likelihood have
een irreversible, thus frustrating the declared principles of the OAS. We
acted to preserve the freedom of choice of the Dominican people until the
OAS could take charge and insure that its principles were carried out.
It is now doing so.
See also id. at 939-40 (statement by Rusk at a press conference held May 26, 1965).
In a more recent address made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention on
August 22, 1966, at New York, Rusk has reiterated that "'We cooperated with the
OAS .. .in preventing chaos and a possible Communist takeover in the Dominican
Republic .. " 55 DEP'T STATE BULL. 362, 367 (1966).
12 See e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 869, 871, 880-82 (1965) (statements by Stevenson
before the U.N. Security Council).
13 See e.g., id. at 908-10 (statements by Bunker before the Tenth Meeting of Consul-
tation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs).
14 Id. at 1042, 1046 (address by Ball on June 6, 1965).
15 Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53 id. at
60.
IOSee, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 8778 (daily ed. April 30, 1965), for remarks by Senator
Stennis that "We cannot afford to wait for the OAS to act first .... We cannot
permit a Communist regime to set itself up in the Dominican Republic .... See id.
at 8838 (daily ed. May 3, 1965), for remarks by Representative Andrews that the
President's "expressed determination to prevent the establishment of another
Communist regime in this hemisphere [as indicatd by the United States action]




effect that the United States decision to send in additional troops to
the Dominican Republic and to maintain them there was in response
to the Communist danger to take over the rebel leadership.
It is difficult to establish an evidentiary basis for the official
United States view of the Dominican crisis. Official statements
He further urged the President "to quickly announce that the liquidation of Cuba's
Communist government is a definite aim of American foreign policy, and that no
pressures from any source ...will dissuade us from that goal." For more remarks
made in the Congress on May 3 on the Communist take-over in the Dominican
Republic, see id. at 8809, 8840, 8882. See also id. at 9000-10 '(daily ed. May 4,
1965), for Senator Lausche's statement that "we cannot suffer the existence of
another Cuba at our shores in the Caribbean . . .. [T]he overwhelming evidences
are that the Communists have taken hold." See id. at 9038, for Senator Long's
remarks; id. at 9722 (daily ed. May 10, 1965), for remarks by Senator Gruening
that "The United States, having intervened to stave off a Communist dictatorship,
cannot now abandon the Dominican people." See id. at 11029 (daily ed. May 24,
1965), for remarks by Senator Dodd that,
The Communists began to infiltrate and take control of the insurrection
almost from the moment it was launched on the morning of April 24.
By April 26, they already exercised a serious degree of control. By April
27, their control had reached such alarming proportions that virtually all
of the authentic non-Communist leaders had abandoned the revolution .
. . .By his action, President Johnson has prevented the emergence of a
second Castro regime in the Americas.
See id. at 11585 (daily ed. May 28, 1965), for remarks by Representative Gallagher
that,
I believe the action that the United States took at the end of April prob-
ably saved the Dominican Republic from a Communist takeover. The exact
degree of Communist control over the rebel movement at that moment
can never be measured accurately, of course. But the fact remains that the
risk was grave; it left this Government with no alternative but to arrest
the threat.
See id. at 13468 (daily ed. June 17, 1965), for remarks by Representative Rogers
that,
It is clear that had the United States acted as swiftly in Cuba as was done
in the Dominican Republic Castro and communism would not be in Havana
today. It is also clear that we must pursue a firm policy in the Dominican
Republic to curb Castroism in the Caribbean.
See id. at 20720 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1965), for remarks by Senator Lausche that
"the proof before that Committee [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] was clear
that within 3 days after the violence broke out, groups connected with Peiping,
Moscow, and Castro took over." See id. at 22427 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1965), for
remarks by Representative Flood when he talked of the "attempted Red takeover
of the Dominican Republic on April 24, 1965, requiring armed intervention by the
United States to prevent the establishment of a second Soviet satellite in the
Carribbean." He further said that that was a key element "in the strategy of the inter-
national revolutionary conspiracy for world domination." See id. at 24076 (daily ed.
ed. Sept. 23, 1965), for remarks by Representative Selden, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: "U.S. intervention not only prevented a
Communist takeover, but there is every reason to believe it also will provide the
Dominican people another chance to let their wills be known at the ballot box."
See Dubois, Report from Latin America, id. App. A at 2684, 2685 (daily ed. May
26, 1965), wherein Dubois says, "Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., commander of
American land forces here, said earlier that part of his mission was to prevent a
Communist takeover and establishment of a government inimical to the interest of the
United States." See also id. at 20505-48, 20562-63 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1965), for an
extensive record of reports by press correspondents who thought that the danger of
Communist take-over was not a myth but a reality. These reports were introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Dodd. See also the OAS Special Com-
mittee Report at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Document 46 (provisional) May 7-8, 1965),
recorded id. at 20551-62.
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repeatedly referred to classified information which formed the basis
for their decisions. On October 12, 1965, Undersecretary Mann said:
All those in our Government who had full access to official infor-
mation were convinced that the landing of additional troops was
necessary in view of the dear and present danger of the forcible
seizure of power by the Communists. The evidence we have indi-
cates that at that stage the paramilitary forces under the control of
known Communists exceeded in military strength the forces con-
trolled by the non-Communist elements within the rebel movement.
17
He went on to say that:
The strength of the Communist component of the rebel side must
be measured not only by its men and arms and its superior disci-
pline but by the weakness, the divisions, and the lack of leadership
within the rebel movement. It needs to be measured in light of the
fact that the Communists were operating in a total political vacuum
during the early days of the crisis. 18
In a statement made in the Senate on September 16, Senator
Dodd reviewed some of the information which had "convinced the
administration that the Communists had seized control of the revolt
and that any serious delay in intervening was bound to result in
another Cuba in the Carribean.. . ." ' Senator Dodd went on to
assure his colleagues that "the U.S. Government knew much more,
which for a variety of reasons, cannot be documented publicly." 20
The Administration, on several occasions, made public lists of
known Communists in the rebel movement. 21 These lists have, how-
ever, been so thoroughly discredited22 that not much credence can
be put on their accuracy. Moreover, to measure the degree and extent
of the control of a rebel movement by counting the number of known
17 Mann, The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 730, 736 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
18 Ibid.
1l 111 CONG. REc. 23297 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
20 Ibid.
21 See 111 CONG. REc. 23007 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965) (statement by Senator Smath-
ers that there were approximately fifty-eight Communist leaders active in the rebel
movement) ; id. at 24079-81 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) (a list of seventy-seven such
Communists) ; id. App. A at 3071-72 (daily ed. June 14, 1965), article by O'Leary,
reprinted in the Congressional Record from Washington Star, June 13, 1965, en-
titled, U.S. Documents Red Attempt to Seize Revolt...). See 52 DEP'T STATE BULL.
816 (1965), to the effect that Johnson had declared as early as May 4 that the
United States intelligence reports showed that several rebels had been trained by
Communist forces, saying "up to yesterday they had the names and addresses and
experiences and numbers and backgrounds of some 58 .... They ... took increased
leadership in the movement.... Id. at 821. See also id. at 745 (President's statement
of May 1, 1965).
22See, e.g., Draper, The Dominican Crisis, COMMENTARY 33, 54-55 (Dec. 1965);
(expos6 of the lists of Communists said to be involved in the Dominican Conflict);
Goodsell, Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 1965, p. 1, col. 1; Geyelin, Dominican
Flashback: Behind the Scenes, Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1965, p. 8, col. 3.
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Communists participating in the movement is to apply a criterion of
doubtful validity. 8
B. Criticism of the United States Position
Several critics have suggested that the United States over-reacted
to the situation and disproportionately magnified the danger of a
Communist coup. These critics argued that while Communist partici-
pation in the rebel movement should be acknowledged, this par-
ticipation should be carefully distinguished from the degree of
Communist control of the movement. They dismiss any possibility
of Communist control by pointing to the weakness of the Communist
movement within the Dominican Republic coupled with the lack of
any evidence of significant external assistance to the rebels from the
International Communist movement, especially from Cuba. 4
Senator Fulbright led the attack on the official United States
position regarding the degree and extent of Communist control in
the rebel movement. His observations were based on the conclusions
he drew from the Dominican hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. He declared on the Senate floor that
The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate
in planning the revolution.... The evidence does not establish that
the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution.
There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary
23 See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 876, 882 (1965), wherein Ambassador Stevenson
stated:
But I would remind you that only 12 men went to the hills with Castro in
1956 and that only a handful of Castro's own supporters were Communists.
I would also remind you that Castro, too, came into power under cover of
constitutionalism, moderation, and cooperation with others.
See also MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 706: "I would point out that in such a
situation a few leaders can exert great leverage on large numbers of uninformed
people." See also note 28 infra (statement by Senator Smathers) ; 111 CONG. REc.
23296 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965) '(statement by Senator Dodd). Senator Dodd, is
however, emphatic that:
Criterion No. 1 in determining whether a movement or uprising is simply
supported by Communists or controlled by them, is the number of identifi-
able Communists, many of them with training in Castro Cuba, who occupied
command positions in the rebel movement.
Criterion No. 2 is the general political composition of the revolt.
Ibid. Applying these criteria, Senator Dodd asserts that the Communists were in con-
trol of the Dominican revolution. Id. at 23297.
24 See e.g., former President Juan Bosch's statement, in Bosch, Communism and De-
mocracy in the Dominican Republic, Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 1965, inserted in 111
CONG. REc. 18922 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1965). See also id. App. A at 5376-78 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1965) (statement by Bosch) ; id. at 18131 (daily ed. July 29, 1965)
36; id. at 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (statement by Senator Clark) ; id. at
26423 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1965) (editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 14,
1965, entitled Lame Rebuttal, saying in part that "The administration appears to
contend that any Communist activity in Latin America must by definition represent
intervention by a Communist state. But no evidence has been presented of any sub-




movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of
speculation.
25
Further, maintaining that there is a crucial distinction between
"Communist support" and "Communist control" of a political move-
ment, Senator Fulbright argued that since the Administration had
acted on the premise that "the revolution was controlled by Com-
munists - a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has
not established since," the burden of proof was on the Administra-
tion "and the administration has not proven its assertion of Com-
munist control.
' 2 6
Senator Fulbright's views were vehemently challenged by some
of his colleagues in Congress, including the members of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. Senators Long, 27 Smathers, s
Dodd,29 Lausche,80 and Representative Selden, 81 were notable in
disagreeing with his position. Equally strong views were expressed
25 111 CONG. REC. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
26Ibid.
27 Id. at 23005 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965):
So far as I am concerned, this was simply a matter of whether this country
was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban type Communist takeover,
or whether we were going to move on the theory that this looked very much
as though it might be a Communist takeover, and that we would rather take
the chance of moving when it might not be necessary, than take the risk -
as President Eisenhower did - that this would be a Communist takeover.
We have information now that the Communists in the Dominican Republic
are stronger than Castro was when he started out to take Cuba.
We have information, available to the Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to
believe there is a real threat of Communist subjugation and conquest of that
island. That we do not wish to see take place.
See also id. at 23617 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965).
28 111 CONG. REc. 23006 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965):
[F~or a certainty they sought to take over the Dominican Republic just as
they did Cuba, and that was a matter of grave concern to us when the
President sent in our troops to Santo Domingo .... What is wrong with
trying to save a country from Communism?
We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were
only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he
started his revolution.
29Id. at 23294, 23296-97 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965). See also id. at 23296, where
Dodd suggests certain criteria to determine "with a reasonable degree of accuracy"
the extent of Communist control; id. at 23297, Dodd applies the set criteria to the
Dominican situation to prove that the Administration was convinced "that the Com-
munists had seized control of the revolt and that any serious delay in intervening was
bound to result in another Cuba in the Caribbean." For statements by several Latin
American ambassadors conceding the threat of a Communist take-over and introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Dodd, see id. at 23295-96.
30 Id. at 23345-46 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965):
[T]he proof was clear and convincing that unless we had stepped in we
would have at our shores another Cuba....
When the coup began, they [the Communists) immediately sprung to
the forefront, and within a few days they were occupying the leading posi-
tions in what was happening....
I am firmly of the conviction that if the President had not acted as he
did.., we now would have practically at our shores another Cuba.
31Id. at 24073 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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in support of Fulbright's position, notably by his colleagues, Senators
Clark," Morse," and Young of Ohio.
3 4
Thus we are left with two conflicting contentions by the propo-
nents and the opponents of the official United States position as to
the threat of a Communist take-over. In the absence of an inde-
pendent fact-finding agency whose conclusions might be acceptable
to all concerned, 5 we have perhaps no other choice but to rely upon
the official United States position that not only did the Administra-
tion perceive the Communist threat as imminent but that it also had
sufficient evidence to prove it, and that security reasons alone pre-
vent the Administration from divulging secret information on Com-
munist participation and control of the rebel movement.
3 1
Granting then that the danger of a Communist take-over in the
Dominican conflict was a real one,"7 the next section will test the
32 See, e.g., Clark's comment that the Committee on Foreign Relations was given a
whole sheaf of classified information on alleged Communist domination of the
Dominican revolt but that
[I)t was completely unconvincing as to any control of the revolution by
Communists except that it indicated that after, but not before, the massive
American intervention, a number of Communists did raise their heads and
take an active part in the revolution.
Id. at 23541 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965) (emphasis added). See also id. at 23366
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965). For the criticism of the United States action by some
prominent Latin American leaders - Presidents of Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and
Mexico-see id. at 23540-41 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965). See also id. at 10209
'(daily ed. May 14, 1965), N.Y. Times editorial entitled The Dominican Morass,
which reads in part:
Whether there was or was not a genuine threat of a Communist coup-
and U.S. correspondents are emphatic in casting doubt on Washington's
assertions that there was - it is clear that Dominican and Latin American
communism has been strengthened in reaction against the American inter-
vention.
33 See, e.g., Morse's remarks that "the contention of the State Department that the
revolution was Communist-controlled was never substantiated by the State De-
partment before our committee [Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]." Id. at
26184 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).
34 See id. at 23846 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965), to the effect that there was "no evidence
of any Castro-like takeover." Young contends that "No communist was a leader in
the revolt . . . [T]here was no preponderance of the evidence available or adduced
that such a Communist takeover was even remotely in prospect."
35 See OEA/Ser. L/X/II, at 4-5 (Nov. 10, '1965), for the Report of the Special Con-
sultative Committee of the OAS on the Dominican Situation, PAU, Special Consulta-
tive Committee on Security, Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security
on the Work Done during its Fifth Regular Meeting.
36 See, e.g., Olsen, U.S. Holding Back Dominican Paper, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965,
p. 34, col. 1 (city ed.), for a report that a State Department White Paper, about 60
manuscript pages, "is said to contain heretofore unpublished evidence supporting the
Government's appraisal of the Communist menace inherent in the April 24 revolt."
37 See, e.g., MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 705: "I have no doubt whatsoever that
there was a real danger of a Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic." Com-
pare HALPERN, BAD NEIGHBOR POLICY (1966), The New York Review of Books,
Dec. 29, 1966, p. 10, 11, col. 2:
The only guiding principle of Washington's present Latin American policy
appears to be an obsession with the danger of a Communist takeover in
some Latin American country where things are not kept firmly enough
under control .... [Slince the missile crisis of October 1962, Latin Ameri-
cans tend to regard it as a mere pretext for interference in the internal
affairs of their countries.
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validity of the United States action against the norms of inter-
national law.
C. Validity of the United States Action
Translated into legal terms, the United States' claim that it was
sending forces to prevent another Cuba implies that the situation
warranted self-defense measures by the United States. Thus, to
justify the United States action, one must first determine the boun-
daries of legitimate self-defense in international law. One could
point to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Articles 3 and 6
of the Rio Treaty, and various OAS resolutions declaring Commu-
nism to be incompatible with the Inter-American system,"8 to indicate
what those boundaries are.
The United States did not base its claim on Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter which, notwithstanding the restrictions on
the use of force by a member state as contained in Article 2 (4) of
38 On the general question of the Communist "intervention" in the hemisphere, the
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at Punta del Este,
decided per its Resolution 11(1) to request the OAS Council "to maintain all neces-
sary vigilance" regarding the Communist interventionist activities in the hemisphere,
both to warn the governments of such actions and to recommend appropriate meas-
ures with regard thereto. Subsequently the Council, on October 9, 1962, resolved to
entrust the task to a Special Committee to deal with Resolutions 11(1) and VIII of
the 8th meeting. See also Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security,
"The First Tricontinental Conference," Another Threat to the Security of the Inter-
American System, (study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security
at its Sixth Regular Meeting) ; OEA/Ser. L/X/II. 12 (April 2, 1966) (regarding a
study on the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference Havana,
Jan. 3-15, 1966). Id. at 240-241, the Conference adopted a resolution condemning
the United States. House of Representatives Resolution of September 20, 1965 (notes
87-91 infra). Id. in operative paragraph 1, the Conference rejected "the pretensions
of the House of Representatives of the United States that arbitrarily intends to abro-
gate the right of intervening in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries."
Id. in operative paragraph 4, the Conference proclaimed "the right of the peoples
and governments of Latin America to request the assistance of any other state in the
world in case the imperialists intervene in their internal affairs, and the right and
duty of all countries to offer moral and material support to the peoples of our con-
tinent." Id. at 242-44, resolutions condemning the "so-called Inter-American Peace
Force and the Governments that support it," alleging that its purpose was to inter-
vene in the national liberation movements. See also id. at 239, for criticism of the
OAS for creating the Inter-American Peace Force; id. at 238-39, for resolutions on
the OAS. Id. at 239, the Conference proclaimed that:
Neither the peoples of Latin America nor the governments that may come
into power as a result of the victory of the national liberation movements
in this continent are bound by any agreements or treaties of the Organiza-
tion of American States, particularly the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance, ad those that deny in practice the principles of non-inter-
vention, self-determination, sovereign equality and independence.
See also Council of the OAS, OEA/Ser. G./IV, C-i-769 (Pan Am. Union 1966) for
the November 28, 1966 Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions 11.2
and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on
the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projec-
tions (Tricontinental Conference of Havana) -New Instrument of Communist Inter-
vention and Aggression. For an earlier report of the Special Committee, see Council
of the OAS, OEA/Ser. G/IV, C-i-605 (Pan Am. Union 1963). See also the Dec-
laration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against the Intervention of International Communism at the Tenth Inter-
American Conference, Caracas, 1954. On the Caracas conference, see generally Tenth
Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela March 1-28, 1954 (Report of the
Pan Am. Union on the conference, PAU 1955). For a recent report on the "trouble-
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the United Nations Charter, 9 leaves the "inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self defense" of a member state unimpaired in case
of an "armed attack" occurring against it.40  A brief discussion of
the nature and scope of article 51 will, however, be helpful in
putting the question of self-defense in a proper prospective.
It may be recalled that the Cuban Quarantine in November
1962, had reopened the debate on the import of "armed attack"
within the context of article 51. Challenging the legality of the
United States action, Professor Quincy Wright reiterated his earlier
stand that the use of force by a nation state must be in response to
an "actual armed attack."'" More recently, in his discussion on the
Viet-Nam conflict, Professor Wright has again asserted that
it is true that traditional international law permitted military action
if in self-defense there were an instant and overwhelming necessity
some resurgence of guerrilla activity" in Latin America, see Goodsell, New terrorist
acts called Castro's work, The Christian Science Monitor, April 1, 1967, p. B7, col.
1-3. See also Gonzalez, Guerrilla Groups in Latin American Countries, 112 CONG.
REc. 25977 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1966). See also Goodsell, Dominican backlash touched
off, The Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1967, p. 5, col. 3, reports on terrorist
activities and "mounting political tension" in the Dominican Republic. See also
Goodsell, Civil War Echo.' Dominican Republic Terrorism Mounts, id. May 16, 1967,
p. 11, col. 4-5; Reuter's report Dominican sees plot by Hundreds: Balaguer charges
Reds are fomenting a revolution, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1967, p. 10, col. 1;
an editorial entitled, Violence in Santo Domingo, id. May 13, 1967, p. 32, col. 1-2,
and a new item from Hong Kong reportedly based on a commentary in Hsiahua, the
Red Chinese news agency and entitled Peking Acclaims Dominican Reds: says Mao's
ideas help them make giant strides, id. p. 9, col. 1. On the recent activities of re-
portedly Castroite guerillas in Bolivia, see id., May 11, 1967, p. 9, col. 1. On the
"increasing tempo of the activities of the Havana-based Tri-Continental Congress"
that was reportedly resulting in unrest in Latin America, see Senator Thurmond's
remarks entitled Latin American subversion, a collection of several articles dealing
with the "plan of the international Communist conspiracy," 113 CONG. REC. S 7181
(daily ed. May 19, 1967).
39 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
40 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
41 Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963). Wright concludes:
It cannot be doubted that the United States Government acted skillfully to
obtain the removal of the long-range missiles from Cuba. ... It cannot be
easily argued, however, that the United States has lived up to its legal
obligations to respect the freedom of the seas, to submit threats to the peace
to the United Nations before taking unilateral action, and to refrain from
use or threat of force in international relations except in individual or col-
lective self-defense against armed attack, under authority of the United
Nations, or with consent of the state against which the force is used.
The episode has not improved the reputation of the United States as a
champion of international law....
The Cuban quarantine, like the Suez and Hungarian episodes of 1956,
demonstrates the reluctance of a great Power to observe its legal obligations
when dealing with unpalatable action or attitudes of a small state, especially





permitting no moment for deliberation, i.e., if hostile forces were
about to attack. It seems clear, however, that the San Francisco Con-
ference, by limiting self-defense to cases of 'armed attack' intended
to eliminate all preventive or pre-emptive action in order to maintain
to the utmost the basic obligation of Members of the United
Nations to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force.'
42
Professor Myres McDougal, on the other hand, would construe
article 51 to honor "appropriate responses to threats of imminent
attack. ' 48 He would consider article 51 to safeguard the customary
right of self-defense and not to restrict it. This would mean that
anticipatory self-defense measures by a nation state, once it had met
the customary standards of necessity and proportionality, would be
considered permissible." Commenting on the Cuban Quarantine
controversy, Professor Brunson MacChesney concluded that nothing
in the history of article 51 required "a construction limiting self-
defense to a response to an armed attack."45 He warned that realism,
common sense, and the destructive nature of modern weapons de-
mand the retention of this customary right under adequate safeguards
until the community system makes its use no longer necessary.46
Perhaps by "realism" and "common sense" Professor MacChes-
ney refers to the need to meet the pressing challenges of what have
often been described as acts of "indirect aggression" in the present
world. One such case in point was that of Lebanon which, in June
1958, had claimed the application of provisions of article 51 to
justify the landing of United States forces on its soil. Lebanon said
that the United States forces in Lebanon were in response to its
request for assistance against what it termed was the indirect aggres-
sion of the United Arab Republic. 47
In the Security Council debates the United States representative,
Ambassador Lodge, urged the United Nations to support the efforts
" Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 765
(1966.)
43 McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597,
600 (1963).
4Ibid:
There is, further, nothing in the subsequent conduct of the parties to the
agreement expressed in the United Nations Charter which would indicate
genuine shared expectations that they had in Article 51 given up their cus-
tomary right of self-defense; indeed, again, the most relevant official utter-
ances would suggest the exact opposite.
Professor McDougal refers to Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-
Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law,
31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962); McDevitt, The UN Charter and the Cuban
Quarantine, 17 JAG J. 71 (1963) (collection of relevant official utterances).
45 MacChesney, Some Comments on the 'Quarantine' of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592,
594 (1963).
46 Ibid.
4 See U.N. Doc. No. S/4007 (1958), for letter dated May 22, 1958 from the Leb-
anese Representative addressed to the Security Council President; U.N. SEcuRITY
COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th year, 823d meeting 1-22 (S/PV.823) (1958) (Lebanese
Representative's address before the Security Council).
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of a democratically elected government to protect itself from indirect
aggression. He recalled the United Nation's handling of the Greek
question in 1946 and the "Essentials of Peace" and "Peace Through
Deeds" resolutions4" adopted by the General Assembly to show that
the United Nations' duty extended to cases of indirect aggression. 9
President Eisenhower and several representatives at the United
Nations also held that since Lebanon's appeal had been made in
accordance with the provisions of article 51,50 the United States was
justified in responding to the appeal. It was claimed that: "The
armed attack referred to in Article 51 need not be direct attack.
Article 51 was intended to cover all cases of attack, direct or indirect.
11 ' It was asserted by other United Nations representatives that
since no "armed attack" had occurred against Lebanon, article 51
did not apply and that the United States action was in violation of
article 2 (4).5 The Council debates left the issue unresolved." It
may also be recalled that the United Nations' efforts to define
"aggression," "armed aggression," "self-defense,"' 54 and "armed
attack" have thus far remained futile.
55
Contemporary political conditions would perhaps demand that
"armed attack" in article 51 not be read to mean "actual armed
attack.'"'5 Revolutionary changes in science and technology with
their impact on armaments, the so-called "wars of national libera-
tion," and highly sophisticated and refined mechanisms of carrying
on subversive activities might, after all, prove as dangerous to the
"political independence" and "territorial integrity"57 of a nation state
48 See U.N. GEN. Ass. Res. 290 (IV) 1949 and Res. 380 (V) 1950, the last of which
denounces as a form of aggression and international crime, the "fomenting of civil
strife in the interest of a foreign Power."
49 
See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th year, 827th meeting 6-11 (S/PV.827)
(1958) (statements by Ambassador Lodge).
50 See GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 3d Emer. Sp. Sess., Plenary 733, at 7-10 (A/or/ES.
III/PV.733) (1958). See also id., Plenary 737, at 51-53 (statement by the Repre-
sentative of New Zealand, it being a typical statement of a similar plea made by
several other representatives).
51 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, Supp. No. 2, at 467
(1964).
52 See id. at 467-68 (summary of this viewpoint).
53 See id. at 468-69. See also Wright, The United States Intervention in the Lebanon,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
54 See generally BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958) (on self-
defense) ; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1963) (on self-defense); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUC-
TION 163-69 (1948) (on self-defense).
5 See, e.g., U.N. GEN. Ass., Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, Supp. No. 16 (A/3574) (1957); U.N. GEN. Ass.,
Report of the 6th Committee, (A/3576) (1957), for a wide range of views pre-
sented therein. See generally STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958).
58 For a strong plea for this position by Professor McDougal, see note 43 supra.
57 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, which, as a major principle of the United Nations,
prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."
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as an open armed attack." It is no surprise that such a strong advo-
cate of restricting the right of self-defense to cases of "actual armed
attack" as Professor Quincy Wright, has recently observed that:
There can be no doubt but that bodies of armed 'volunteers' cross-
ing a frontier or cease-fire line, such as the Chinese in the Korean
hostilities of 1950, or ostensibly private 'military expeditions' or'armed bands' leaving one country for the purpose of attacking an-
other, as the Cuban refugees in the Bay of Pigs affair of 1961,
constituted, if of considerable magnitude, an 'armed attack.' 59
Even if one assumes that the provisions of article 51 concerning
armed attack are to be construed to apply to a situation such as that
of Greece in 1946 and Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, wherein it was
claimed that subversive elements fomented and assisted by external
participants threatened the political independence or territorial in-
tegrity of a nation state, would the 1965 Dominican conflict qualify
as a similar situation? Or would it qualify as a situation similar to
the one created by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962
which, it was claimed, posed an imminent threat to the security of
the United States, thereby making anticipatory self-defense measures
justifiable?
To answer the latter question first, even given Professor
McDougal's broad interpretation of article 51, and the official
United States view of the "facts" of the Dominican conflict, the
United States action in sending armed forces could not be sustained
as having complied with the provisions of article 51. To argue that
the presence of Communists in the rebel movement or that a Com-
munist threat to take over the movement presented a situation simi-
lar to that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, thereby constituting an
"armed attack" against the United States and giving the United
States the right to take anticipatory self-defense measures, would be
a futile attempt in reasoning and logic.
The first question, i.e., whether or not indirect aggression
threatened the political independence of the Dominican Republic
and thus justified collective self-defense measures, will be answered
not merely within the framework of article 51 but within the broader
5 See, e.g., Meeker, Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense, 56 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 54, 59 (1967), stating:
I have heard and read arguments by some that Viet-Nam does not
present a situation of "armed attack" because invading armies were not
massed at a border and did not march across it in broad daylight. To be
sure, that is the way armed attacks occurred in 1914, at the beginning of
World War II, and even in Korea. But strategies and tactics have changed.
. . . The judgment whether North Viet-Nam has engaged in "armed
attack" against the South cannot depend on the form or appearance of its
conduct. The crucial consideration is that North Viet-Nam has marshaled
the resources of the state and has sent instrumentalities of the state, in-
cluding units of its regular armed forces, into South Viet-Nam to achieve.
state objectives by force- in this case to subject the South to its rule.
9 Wright, supra note 42, at 765.
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perspective of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty),6" the OAS Charter,"' and other community prescrip-
tions as evidenced by declarations and resolutions of the United
Nations and the OAS.
Article 3(1) of the Rio Treaty provides that "an armed attack
by any State against an American State shall be considered as an
attack against all the American States... ." In such a situation each
member state "undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exer-
cise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations."
If we consider the provisions of this article in conjunction with
article 2(4) of the United Nations, prior OAS declarations, the
recent reaffirmation by the United Nations General Assembly that
"armed attack by one State against another or the use of force in
any other form contrary to the charter of the United Nations con-
stitutes a violation of international law giving rise to international
responsibility,"62 and the earlier discussion on the import of armed
attack in the contemporary world, one might come to a tentative
conclusion that the threatened Communist take-over of the Domini-
can Republic constituted an armed attack against the country, and
hence, the United States was exercising its right of collective self-
defense. After all, the Tenth Inter-American Conference of the OAS
had, in a resolution adopted at Caracas in 1954,3 declared that the
domination or control of the political institutions of any American
state by the international Communist movement constituted a threat
to the sovereignty and political independence of the American states
and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to take appropriate
measures. Again, in 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting at Punta del Este,6 4 declared
that Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the principles of the
Inter-American system. The meeting excluded "the present Govern-
ment of Cuba" from participation in the Inter-American system be-
cause of this "incompatibility.''65 It also urged upon
the member States to take those steps they may consider appropriate
for their individual or collective self-defense. . . to counteract
60 Signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace
and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 15-Sept. 2, 1947.
"5 Signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, in 1948.
62 Resolution adopted on Nov. 30, 1966, by a vote of 98-2-8, U.N. Doc. No.
A/2160/XXI (1966).
63 Resolution adopted at the Tenth American Conference, Caracas; see Resolutions
XCIII, Declaration of Solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of
the American states against the intervention of international Communism, and XCV,
Declaration of Caracas, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 433,
436 (2d Supp. 1942-54).
64 Final act, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1962.
65 O.A.S., ser. F/11.8 (Resolution VI).
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threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace
and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hem-
isphere of Sino-Soviet powers. 66
Subsequently, the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs was even more specific in suggesting measures to
meet the danger of Communist subversion. After finding Cuba
guilty of attempting to subvert Venezuelan institutions through sab-
otage, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare, the Meeting adopted a reso-
lution warning the Cuban Government that, if it persisted in carrying
out aggressive and interventionist acts against one or more member
states of the OAS, the member states "shall preserve their essential
rights as sovereign States by the use of self-defense in either individ-
ual or collective form, which could go so far as a resort to armed
forces. .... " 67
However, even if the United States qualified, under article 3 (1)
of the Rio Treaty, to take collective self-defense measures, a pre-
requisite for taking such unilateral action contained in article 3 (2)
is that the state attacked must first make a request for help. The
responding state could render aid "in fulfillment of the obligation"
contained in article 3(1) which aid might continue until the Organ
of Consultation took appropriate measures to meet the situation.
There was no established government in the Dominican Republic to
ask for United States assistance. Ambassador Stevenson asserted
that the United States had sent forces to the Dominican Republic
because on April 28, "the only apparent responsible authority in
Santo Domingo addressed a request to the United States Government
to send in armed forces." 6 But it should be noted that in view of
the prevailing chaotic conditions in the Dominican Republic, and in
view of the almost evenly balanced competing claims of the rebels
and the military junta for the control of the people and resources of
the country, the military junta could not be said to have the authority
to speak for the state. Furthermore, the request for armed forces was
initially made to protect United States citizens and other nationals.6"
In the days to follow, the United States was never asked to send in
more troops or to keep those that were already there for the new
purpose of preventing a Communist take-over which might endanger
68 Resolution 11, Pan. Am. Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Applications 1960-64, 70, 72 (1964).
67 See op. cit. supra note 63, at 186.
68U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1200th meeting 5 (S/PV.1200)
(1965) (Ambassador Stevenson's statement).
69See, e.g., 52 DEPT STATE BULL. 742 (1965), for the President's statement of
April 30, 1965:
We took this step when and only when, we were officially notified by
police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no
longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign na-
tionals and to preserve law and order.
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the political independence or territorial integrity of the Dominican
Republic.
The 1965 Dominican crisis would therefore present a situation
different from the ones in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 or in Greece
in 1946, and could not be justified under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. And, since the conditions of Artide 3(2) of the
Rio Treaty were not met, the United States' action would not be
justified under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.70
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty7' applies to a situation wherein the
"inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence" of an American state is affected by "aggres-
sion which is not an armed attack," but which might "endanger the
peace of America." In view of the earlier discussion on Communist
participation in the rebel movement, could the Dominican Republic
be said to have been a victim of such an aggression?7" If so, the
strict prohibitions of Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter against
intervention in the internal affairs of another member state, no mat-
ter for what reason, would be modified by Article 19 of the OAS
Charter which authorizes measures undertaken for the maintenance
of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties.
However, Article 6 of the Rio Treaty expressly provides the
procedure for remedial measures, and these should be undertaken
only by the Organ of Consultation. Although the United States'
70 See Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM.
J. INT'L L. 857, 868 (1965). Compare Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Re-
public Crisis 1965: Legal Aspects, HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS 32-34 (1966). They
justified the United States action under the Rio Treaty on the theory that:
[A) third state may act in self-defense to assist another state in repelling
an aggression when there exists a close relationship between the two
states based on solidarity for the legal interests of both states would be
violated by an armed attack against either one of them.
Id. at 33-34, they would justify the United States action on the basis of the
doctrine of "necessity" which, they admit in the footnote, is "often disputed
and is generally limited to the necessity to act in self-defense only." Id. at 33-34
n.86. There may be some question as to the application of the customary prescrip-
tions to conditions of anarchy and as to whether such conditions might demand the
application of a different set of prescriptions. See BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 54,
at 321.
71 FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES App. B, Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, art. 6, at 574-75 (1963):
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty
or political independence of any American State should be affected by an
aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-
continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger
the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately
in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggres-
sion to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance
of the peace and security of the Continent.
7 See notes 6-20 supra and accompanying text. See also 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744,
747 (1965), containing the President's statement of May 2: "[R]evolution in any
country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for




action did not meet with the procedural requirements of article 6,
could it perhaps still be argued, since the time factor was crucial, and
the initial United States action was undertaken to preserve the status
quo until the OAS took over, that the United States did not violate
the spirit of the law? Prior to taking any unilateral action had not
the United States asked the OAS to meet?7 3 And, subsequent to its
action, did it not willingly agree to follow the OAS mandate?74 To
illustrate, the official United States memorandum outlining the legal
basis for the United States' action was quite explicit in its pronounce-
ment that the continued presence of the United States forces in the
Dominican Republic was
for the additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to
function in the manner intended by its charter-to achieve peace
and justice by securing a cease-fire and by reestablishing orderly
processes within which Dominicans can choose their own govern-
ment, free from outside interference.
75
Similar statements were made by, among others, Secretary Rusk,'
7
Ambassadors Stevenson7 7 and Bunker,
78 and legal advisor Meeker.
79
This justification for the United States action would be further
supported by the subsequent action of the OAS. By establishing an
Inter-American Peace Force,8 ° the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers perhaps implicitly approved of the United States
action. Thus it could be argued that the United States took pre-
liminary measures to preserve the situation for collective action,
which eventually followed, thereby ratifying the initial unilateral
action by the United States. Furthermore, the Security Council of
the United Nations had also given implicit approval to the United
States action by rejecting the Soviet resolution to condemn the United
73The United States had asked the Peace Committee of the OAS to meet on the
twenty-seventh. On the morning of the twenty-eighth it again called upon the OAS
Council to meet and discuss the Dominican situation. See 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 941
(1965) (Secretary Rusk's statement).
74 See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 874-75, 879-80, 883-85 (1965) (Ambassador
Stevenson's statements made in the Security Council debates).
75 111 CONG. REc. 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965). The Memorandum further said,
"The action of the United States has given the organs of the OAS the essential time
in which to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic and to determine
means of preserving the rights that country has under the Inter-American system."
76 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 842 (1965).
771d. at 879-80.
78 Id. at 859.
79 Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law, 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 62 (1965).
8 0 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6333 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965); 52
DEP'T STATE BULL. 862-63 (1965), for the text of the resolution adopted in Plenary
Session by the Tenth Meeting on May 6, 1965, regarding the formation of an Inter-
American force as recommended by the Special Committee. The vote was 15-5 (Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) with Venezuela abstaining. See also 17
AMERiCAS 41-43 (May 1965).
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States armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican
Republic.81
The conclusion, however, is inescapable that since the United
States had unilaterally used armed forces in a primarily internal
conflict situation, it did not comply with the spirit of the law.82 This
conclusion follows regardless of the ex post facto vindication of the
United States claim by the OAS and the United Nations,8" and re-
gardless of the distinctions forwarded to contrast this action from
the prior "gunboat diplomacy" of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century.
8 4
The reaction of the United States Congress following the Do-
minican conflict gives an interesting insight into its members' per-
ception of the relevance of international law to such a situation.
A House Resolution adopted on September 20, 1965,5 provides that,
81 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6328 (1965) (draft resolution by the Soviet Union).
8 Even an ardent critic of the United States action in the Dominican Republic, Senator
Fulbright, concedes that pursuant to the United States action there has been stability
in the country. See generally FULBRIGHT, ARROGANCE OF POWE, 83-92 '(1967).
Those of us who criticized the American intervention must concede that a
degree of order and stability in the Dominican Republic was restored more
quickly than seemed likely in the spring and summer of 1965 and that
credit for this properly belongs to United States diplomacy, to the Organiza-
tion of American States, and to the Inter-American Force which remained
in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1966, as well as to the
provisional government which held office from September 1965 to July
1966 and to the elected government which succeeded it.
Id. at 84. For recent reports on the political situation in the Dominican Republic,
see Rodman, Belaguer: The First Nine Months - An interim report on the Domini-
can Republic, The New Republic, March 25, 1967, at 19-23; Meagher, Belaguer's
Progress gives reasons for Hope, The National Observer, March 13, 1967, p. 12,
col. 3.
8 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6328 (1965), for the text of the Soviet resolution condemning
the United States action and asking for withdrawal of United States forces from
the Dominican Republic. The resolution asking for United States condemnation was
lost in the Council, with the Soviet Union alone voting in its favor and four
members, France, Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia, abstaining. See U.N. SECURIT
COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1214th meeting 22-23 (S/PV.1214) (1965), for
voting on the withdrawal part of the Soviet resolution which was lost with only two
in favor -Soviet Union and Jordan. See also id. 1204th meeting 1-2 (S/6346/Rev.
1) (rejection of the Soviet amendments to the Uruguayan resolution); id. 1214th
meeting 10-12 (to the same effect) ; id. 1216th meeting 10-11. See also Comment,
The Dominican Crisis: An Examination of Traditional and Contemporary Concepts of
International Law, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 547, 565 (1965-66):
It is further argued that prior Security Council authorization was not
required, this evidenced by the fact that the Security Council did not
approve any of the censure motions submitted to the Council against the
United States or the Organization of American States, individually or
collectively.
It is submitted that this conclusion does not follow from the Council's rejection of
the Soviet resolution condemning the United States' action; non-condemnation does
not necessarily mean approval. As is suggested later, in notes 128-38 infra and
accompanying text, the Council did not resolve the issue.
84 See, e.g., The New Diplomacy, 52 DFP'T STATE BULL. 1042, 1045 (1965) (Under-
secretary Ball's address of June 6, 1965), wherein Ball contrasts prior United States
interventions in the Dominican Republic with the "new diplomacy" adopted in the
1965 crisis. Compare FENWICK, op. cit. supra note 71.
85 See 111 CONG. REC. 23458-73 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965) (discussion of the H.R.
560). For voting on the resolution (312 for, 52 against, three answering "present"
and 65 not voting), see id. at 23473-74.
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since any Communist domination or threat of it violates the prin-
ciples of the Monroe Doctrine, 6 and of collective security as
declared by the OAS resolution and acts,17 and is dangerous to the
peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere, any member state can,
in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could
go so far as to resort to armed force.., take steps to forestall or
combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in what-
ever form, by the subversive forces known as international Commu-
nism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.88
The resolution apparently disregards well-established community
norms contained in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter, and Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
As expected, some Latin American countries were unfavorably
disposed toward this resolution. While Peru's Chamber of Deputies
voted to protest against it, and reject it, Colombia's Congress called
it "openly aggressive and contrary to the jurisdiction and political
system of Latin America." 8 9
II. THE COMPETENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES vis-a-vis THE UNITED NATIONS 90
The Dominican crisis reopened the debate on the proper deline-
ation of competence and responsibility between the Organization of
American States and the United Nations to deal with regional con-
flicts in the Western Hemisphere. This section will examine the rele-
vant provisions of the charters of the OAS and the United Nations
and past trends in similar situations, and then appraise the problem
in the light of the Dominican experience.
8 See THE MONROE DOCTRINE (Dozer ed. 1965) (recent study on the Monroe
Doctrine).
87 The Resolution especially referred to the declaration made by the Ninth Meeting of
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation
at Punta del Este in 1962.
8 111 CONG. REc. 23458 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965). See Id. at 24710 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1965) (criticism by Senator Fulbright) ; id. at 25322 '(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1965)
(criticism by Senator Clark).
89 DENNIS, DOMINICAN DILEMMA 270 (Editorial Research Report 1966).
90CAYNES, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(6th ed. 1963); CONNELL & SMITH, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 214-19, 312-15
(1966); INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1966). See generally Claude, Jr., The OAS, the UN,
and the United States, 547 INT'L CONC. (March 1964); Halderman, Regional
Reform Measures and the United Nations, 52 GaO. L.J. 89, (1963); MacDonald,
The Developing Relationship between Superior and Subordinate Political Bodies at
the International Level: A Note on the Experience of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, 2 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 21 (1964); Whitaker,
Development of American Regionalism, 469 INT'L CONC. (March 1951); Wilcox,
Regionalism and the United Nations, 29 INT'L ORGN. 789, 797-803 (1965); Wood




A. The Charter Provisions
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, dealing with
"Regional Arrangements," was a compromise between "regional-
ists""' and "universalists" 92 and was adopted at the United Nations
Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. 93 As
such, it is capable of varying and even conflicting interpretations.
One interpretation would be that regional organizations should be
used to settle local disputes before bringing them to the United
Nations. Article 52(2) of the United Nations Charter for instance,
specifically provides for such an arrangement,94 and article 52(3)
provides for the encouragement of pacific settlement of local dis-
putes through regional machinery. Articles 33 and 51 support the
argument that regional arrangements have priority to deal with dis-
putes of a local nature. Article 33 calls upon the parties to a dispute
to seek, among other means, pacific resort to "regional agencies or
91 Proceedings at the 1945 Inter-American Conference in Mexico City (February 21
to March 13) and the resulting resolution VIII on "Reciprocal Assistance and
American Solidarity," also known as The Act of Chapultapec, show the strong
feelings of the Latin American countries toward regionalism. In large measure, this
attitude stemmed from their misgivings about the effectiveness of a veto-ridden
Security Council as anticipated in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. See generally
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note
90, at XXIX- XXXI. See also id. at XXXI:
The American Republics were particularly concerned by the fact that within
the world structure for the maintenance of peace the privilege of the veto
was established for the so-called "great powers," which, they felt, might
retard or even completely paralyze regional action. [The adoption of Ch.
VIII and the acceptance of the formula incorporated in Article 51 recog-
nizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.] Accept-
ance was thereby given to the legitimacy of regional action with respect to
the pacific settlement of disputes as well as with respect to collective
security and, therefore, to the compatibility of such action with the prin-
ciples and procedures governing both matters in the United Nations
Charter.
See also CAYNES, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED
NATIONS (5th ed. 1960). On the Chapultapec Conference, see INMAN, INTER-
AMERICAN CONFERENCES 1826-1954: HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 210-20 (1965)
'(Chapultapec Conference) .
At San Francisco, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, among others, was a strong
supporter of regionalism. See generally THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VAN-
DENBERG 186-93 (Vandenberg, Jr. ed. 1952), wherein Senator Vandenberg seems
primarily concerned with the protection of the Monroe Doctrine and regionalism
from the possible inroads made by the United Nations.
92 At the higher echelons of the United States decision makers, Secretary Hull's name
should be especially mentioned as a strong proponent of universalism. At the earlier
stages of discussion on the establishment of an international organization, he was
instrumental in formulating the United States preferences toward the subordination
of regional organizations to the projected United Nations. See generally 2 THE
MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1640-46 (1948). See also RUSSELL & MUTHER, A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 121, 255, 398-99 (1958).
93 The conference was held from April 25 to June 26, 1945. See generally 12 Docu-
ments of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Fran.
cisco, 1945 663-866 '(1945) (debates in Commission III, Committee IV).
94 U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2 provides:
The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
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arrangements" for its solution, and article 51 recognizes the "in-
herent right" of collective self-defense. Several provisions in the
Inter-American instruments would further strengthen this contention.
Article 20 of the OAS Charter stipulates that international disputes
between American states "shall be submitted to the peaceful proce-
dures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security
Council of the United Nations." Article 2 of the Rio Treaty provides
for the settlement of "every controversy" between member states
through the Inter-American machinery "before referring it to the
General Assembly 95 1 or the Security Council of the United Nations."
Article II of the 1948 Pact of Bogota96 has a similar provision.
Articles 52 (4), 34 and 39, read in conjunction with Articles 103
and 24 of the United Nations Charter, Article 102 of the OAS
Charter and Article 10 of the Rio Treaty, support a contrary view.
While Article 34 of the United Nations Charter authorizes the
Security Council to investigate any dispute or situation "which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," and article 35
confers upon member states the right to bring before the United
Nations any dispute or situation "of the nature referred to in Article
34," article 39 provides that the "Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" and take appropriate measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Article 103 states that the obliga-
tions of a member state under the United Nations Charter take
precedence over its obligations "under any other international agree-
ment" and if there is a conflict between those obligations, article 24
assigns to the Security Council the primary responsibility for main-
taining international peace and security. Similarly, by declaring that
nothing in the Inter-American agreements would be construed as
impairing the rights and obligations of member states under the
United Nations Charter, Article 102 of the OAS Charter and Article
10 of the Rio Treaty establish the subordination of regional to uni-
versal obligations.
Other pertinent articles in the United Nations Charter are
Articles 36, 41, 43, 53 and 54. While article 36," dealing with pacific
settlement, may be construed to support either position, article 41 and
95 No other Inter-American instrument mentions the General Assembly in this context.
96 See STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 98-115 (1965) (text
of Pact of Bogota, also called the Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement).
97 U.N. CHARTER art. 36 provides in part:
(1) The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature
referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
(2) The Security Council should take into consideration any proce-




42, referring to appropriate measures to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security, are especially important in the context
of article 53, which prohibits regional organizations from taking any
"enforcement action" without prior authority by the Security Council.
Article 54 calls upon the regional organizations to keep the Security
Council fully informed at all times of their "activities undertaken or
in contemplation" for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Any attempt to reconcile the conflicting interpretations which
the charter provisions pose must consider the key words in these
articles, "disputes" and "enforcement action." First, to what kinds
of disputes are the Charter provisions prescribing procedures and
priorities for regional organizations applicable? Second, does the
prior seizing of a local "dispute" by a regional organization preclude
its discussion, investigation, and disposal by the Security Council?
Finally, what does the term "enforcement action" encompass?
Unlike other parts of the United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII
makes no distinction between "disputes" and "situations," 98 and
neither does any Inter-American instrument. Similarly, the term
"enforcement action" is nowhere defined in the United Nations
Charter or in the Inter-American instruments. Thus, the only dis-
cernible guideline for clarification, if any, will be available through
a study of the past trends.
B. Past Trends
It would seem that the charter provisions contemplate no de-
finable limit to the scope of "dispute." Different types of disputes,
both in terms of participants and the nature of the dispute, have
been brought before the United Nations. While participants have
ranged from a Latin American state against the United States or
against another state to a member state against the OAS, the nature
of disputes has varied from outright armed conflicts and conflicts
involving diplomatic and economic sanctions to those alleged to
cause a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. In this section,
a summary review of some selected regional disputes before the
United Nations will show that their prior seizure by the regional
organization has not been considered a strong enough reason to pre-
clude a member state from raising the controversy before the United
Nations, thereby indicating that the obligation of member states to
bring local disputes before the OAS does not bar their access to the
international arena. The following discussion will also show that the
term "enforcement action" has consistently been given a narrow con-
98 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra
note 90, at 183-89 (an elaboration).
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struction, thereby recognizing the autonomy of the OAS to deal with
most regional disputes without prior United Nations authorization.
1. Access to the United Nations
The 1954 Guatemalan crisis,"9 for the first time, raised the
question of the relative competence of the United Nations and the
OAS to deal with a regional dispute.
Following the crossing of the Honduras-Guatemala border by a
rebel army on June 18, 1954, the Government of President Arbenz
appealed simultaneously to the President of the Security Council'..
and the Inter-American Committee' to take appropriate measures
to meet the situation. Subsequently, Arbenz asked the Inter-American
Committee to suspend consideration of Guatemala's complaint and
requested its complete withdrawal since the case was already before
the Security Council.'
In its complaint before the Security Council, Guatemala invoked
Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the United Nations Charter, seeking the
Council's assistance to "put a stop to the aggression in progress"
against it.'08
The Security Council met on June 20 to consider the com-
plaint.104 The Guatemalan representative contended that there was
no dispute between Guatemala and any other state, but that it was a
case of aggression and therefore articles 33 and 55(2) giving prior-
ity to the regional organizations did not apply. He accused Honduras,
Nicaragua, and the United States of conspiring to overthrow the
Guatemalan government and asked the Council to send an observa-
tion team to Guatemala and to warn the states named against con-
tinuing to support the rebels. The Brazilian-Colombian draft
resolution, which would have referred the complaint to the OAS for
urgent consideration,' 0 5 was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Coun-
cil then unanimously adopted the French draft calling upon the
member states to refrain from assisting the belligerents and urging
9 9
JAMES, RED DESIGNS FOR THE AMERICAS: GUATEMALAN PRELUDE (1954);
MECHAM, THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY 1889-1960 445-53
(1961); SILVERT, THE CONFLICT SOcITY: REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN
AMERICA 113-41 (1961); TORIELLO, LA BATALLA DE GUATEMALA (1955); Dreir,
The Organization of American States and United States Policy, 17 INT'L ORGN. 36
(1963); Grant, Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy, 9 J. INT'L AFF. 64
(1955); Taylor, The Guatemalan Affair- A Critique of United States Foreign
Policy, 50 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 787 ('1956).
100 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 9th year, Supp. May-June 1954, at 13(S/32)
(1954).
101 See Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Fifth Meeting of Consul-
tation, App. D (1959).
1 0 2 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra
note 90, at 89-90 (brief report).
103 See note 100 supra.
1
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an immediate termination of hostilities. Thus, the Council assumed
competence to discuss the case, notwithstanding assertion by some
Latin American states and the United States that it should not do so.
Five days later, the Council again met to discuss Guatemala's
complaint that Honduras and Nicaragua were not complying with
the Council's resolution.'0 6 Guatemala invoked Article 103 of the
United Nations Charter in support of its right to obtain access to the
Security Council instead of resorting to the OAS. The vote on placing
the Guatemalan issue on the Council agenda was four in favor, five
against and two (France and the United Kingdom) abstaining. The
outcome, however, did not reflect the Council's verdict against its
competence to deal with a regional conflict but rather was a recogni-
tion of special political and ideological undertones of the Soviet-
United States confrontation in an area of primary United States
influence.
10 7
Since the Security Council and the OAS did nothing to prevent
the fall of the Arbenz government and Guatemala's take-over by
Colonel Castillo Armas, at the next General Assembly session several
Latin American representatives severely criticized the failure of the
Security Council to act. To illustrate, the Argentine representative
asserted that:
The existence of regional arrangements does not mean that they or
the agencies created under them take precedence over the United
Nations, or that the United Nations should refrain from discussing
or endeavouring to settle problems submitted to it by a government
representing a member state.... To hold that the regional organ-
ization has exclusive jurisdiction would in our view lead to the
absurd position that a State Member of the United Nations which
was a party to a regional agreement would be at a disadvantage as
compared with other States... not members of regional agencies. 108
In his annual report the Secretary General seems to endorse
this view:
[I]n those cases where resort to such (regional] ... arrangements
is chosen in the first instance, that choice should not be permitted
to cast any doubt on the ultimate responsibility of the United
Nations. Similarly, a policy giving full scope to the proper role of
regional agencies can and should at the same time fully preserve the
right of a Member nation to a hearing under the Charter. 0 9
As the following discussion would indicate, since then, the right
of a member state to obtain access to the international arena has
1o6Id. 676th meeting (S/PV.676).
1c7 See Claude, supra note 90, at 28-33 (elaboration of this point).
108U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Plenary 488, at 174. See also id. Plenary 481,
at 98; id. Plenary 485, at 148; id. Plenary 486, at 150 (similar arguments by repre-
sentatives of Uruguay, Ecuador and Brazil, respectively).
109See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11 (A/2663) (1954),
cited with approval later in the 1965 Dominican crisis by the Cuban representative
in U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 20th year, 1198th meeting 16-17 (S/PV.1198)
(1965).
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never been denied. But with the exception of the Dominican crisis,
no significant action has been taken by the United Nations in the
area of OAS competence.
In July 1960, responding to a Cuban complaint against the
alleged United States intervention in Cuba's domestic affairs and its
economic aggression against Cuba, 110 the Security Council discussed
the situation on July 18 and 19."' In the Council debate, the issue
was joined on the right of a member state to bring a dispute directly
before the United Nations without first exhausting the "local" rem-
edies. While the United States contended that Cuba was under an
obligation to resort to the Inter-American machinery,"' the Soviet
Union challenged this position, asserting that not only did a member
have a right of access to the Council but that the Council had a re-
sponsibility to deal with a Cuban type complaint." 3 The Argentine-
Ecuador draft resolution, approved by the Council,"' expressed the
Council's concern about the situation and, noting that the situation
was under consideration by the OAS, adjourned its consideration of
the matter pending the receipt of a report from the OAS. The fol-
lowing remarks by the United States' representative on the draft
resolution are helpful in clarifying the purpose of the draft. He
asserted that the resolution would not
deny the Council's competence in the matter, or even settle the legal
question of which organization should act first. What is suggested
is a noting of the concrete circumstance that the regional organiza-
tion is dealing with the question, and a recognition that, for a better
evaluation of the issues, it is useful to have before us the considera-
tions at which the regional organization may arrive. This pre-
liminary measure cannot prevent the Council from... [ensuring]
that the existing situation does not deteriorate before the report of
the Organization of American States is transmitted to us." 15
At the next General Assembly session, Cuba requested the inclu-
sion of the item of the alleged United States interventionist activities
and acts of aggression against Cuba on the agenda for urgent atten-
tion in the plenary session." 6 However, after the inclusion of the
item on the agenda," 7 but before its discussion in the Assembly,
Cuba again sought the Security Council consideration of an impend-
110 Id. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, (S/4378) (1960).
111 Id. 874-76th meetings (1960).
112Id. 874th meeting 28 (1960).
113 Id. 876th meeting 17 (1960).
114U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960 (S/4392)
(1960) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/4395 (1960) (voting was 9-0-2).
115 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, 874th meeting (S/PV.874) '(1960).
116 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Gen. Comm. (1960).
1 7 Id. Plenary 909th (1960).
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ing United States invasion of the island. The Council discussed the
matter but took no formal action." 8
Following the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, the First Commit-
tee of the General Assembly discussed the pending Cuban com-
plaint"' and in a plenary meeting adopted a modified version of a
joint draft resolution that had been recommended by the First Com-
mittee.12 0  The first operative paragraph of the draft resolution,
which would have recognized the role of the OAS to solve the Cuban
question was rejected in the plenary meeting. And in the only
operative paragraph adopted, the General Assembly, without any
special reference to the OAS procedures, exhorted member states to
take such peaceful action as was open to them to remove existing
tension.
12'
At the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, representa-
tives of Ecuador and Peru reopened the debate on their twenty-year-
old boundary dispute. Ecuador denounced the alleged Peruvian
aggression of 1941-42,2 and the Peruvian representative denied the
charges.' Although the Assembly took no formal notice of Ecua-
dor's accusations, another precedent of a Latin American state seek-
ing an international forum to air its dispute with a second Latin
American state was set.
Prior to the 1965 Dominican crisis, two more conflicts were
discussed at the Security Council - the Haiti-Dominican Republic
dispute in May 1963, brought before the Council by Haiti,2 and
the United States-Panamanian dispute in January 1964, brought be-
fore the Council by Panama.1 5  In both instances, the Council
assumed competence and since the parties concerned had in each case
voluntarily agreed to find a peaceful settlement of their disputes
through the OAS procedures and the OAS was already appraised of
118U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF.' REc. 16th year, 921st-923d meetings (S/PV.921-
923) (1961).
119 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., 1st Comm., 1149th-1161st meetings (1961).
120 See id. 1161st meeting at 108-109 (1960) (voting on the draft resolutions in the 1st
Committee). See U.N. GEN. Ass. res. 1616 (XV) (text of the resolution adopted
by a vote of 59-13-24).
121 See Claude, supra note 90, at 43. Professor Claude concludes that "The Cuban case
suggested that Guatemala had not provided a precedent, but had produced a reaction."
121U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess. Plenary 878, at 238 '(1960); id. at 242-244
(speech by the representative of Ecuador).
121 Id. at 244-46 (speech by the representative of Peru) ; id. at 260 (reply by the rep-
resentative of Ecuador). See also N.Y. Times, March 13, 1967, p. 30, col. 4 (city
ed.) (recent report on the conflict).
12 U.N. SECUPITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 18th year, 1035-1036th meetings 8-9 (S/PV.1035-
1036) (1963). See U.N. Doc. No. S/5302 (1963) (Haitian telegram to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council).
125 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 19th year, 1086th meeting (S/PV.1086) (1964).
See U.N. Doc. No. S/5509 (1964) (letter dated Jan. 10, 1964 from the permanent
representative of Panama to the President of the Security Council).
VOL. 44
DOMINICAN CRISIS
the situations, the Council endorsed the OAS efforts without making
any formal decisions.12 The Council, nonetheless, kept these items
on its agenda.1
2 7
2. Meaning and Scope of Enforcement Action
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter prohibits regional or-
ganizations from taking "enforcement action" without prior author-
ity from the Security Council. The limits thereby placed on regional
organizations must be sought in the definition of "enforcement
action." The first occasion for the Council debate on the meaning
and scope of the phrase "enforcement action" as contained in Article
53 of the United Nations Charter arose after the Sixth Meeting of
the Organ of Consultation found the Dominican Republic guilty of
interventionist and aggressive acts not amounting to overt military
attacks against Venezuela. On August 20, 1960, the Organ of Con-
sultation resolved to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions en-
visaged by Article 8 of the Rio Treaty." 8 The resolution simply
authorized the Secretary General of the OAS "to transmit to the
Security Council of the United Nations full information concerning
the measures agreed upon in its resolutions," and the Secretary Gen-
eral complied with these instructions.
129
The Soviet Union requested a Security Council meeting to con-
sider the OAS resolution,' and moved that pursuant to article 53,
the regional measures be approved by the Council.' The Council
considered the question at the three meetings,1 2 and adopted a joint
draft resolution by which it merely took note of the information
transmitted by the Secretary General. 88  Did the Council impliedly
2
6 The Organ of Consultation which had been studying the Haitian-Dominican Repub-
lic situation declared its action concluded on August 12, 1966, since the situation
had considerably improved. 17 AMERICAS 42 (Oct. 1966).
127 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note
90, at 186-88 (summary of the Council's action).
128 Rio TREATY art. 8 provides:
For the purpose of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Con-
sultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of
chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of
consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or
radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.
12U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960 (S/4476)
(1960).
130 See U.N. Doc. No. S/4477 '(1960) (the Soviet note).
'
1
U.N. Doc. No. S/4481 (1960). See also U.N. Doc. No. S/4481/Rev.1 (1960)
(draft resolution).
132U.N. SECurrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, 893d-895th meetings (S/PV.893-
895) (1960).
133U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, 895th meeting 5 (S/4484) (1960)
(jointly moved by Argentina, Ecuador and the United States and adopted by 9-0-2).
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approve the United States position that only coercive, military meas-
ures constituted "enforcement action" needing prior Council author-
ization under article 53? Since the Soviet draft resolution was never
voted upon and the adopted resolution had taken note of the regional
action, it could be argued that the United States position was not
that of the Council and that the meaning of "enforcement action"
was still an open question.
Thus, but for laying down the rough guideline that intense
coercive measures involving the use of military force may not be
employed by a regional organization without prior Council author-
ization, the Security Council debates did not clarify the concept "en-
forcement action" any further.
In February 1962, Cuba requested a Council meeting 13 4 to dis-
cuss the illegality of the alleged enforcement measures undertaken
against her by the Eighth Meeting of the Organ of Consultation in
Punta del Este in January 1962. Those sanctions included the exclu-
sion of the Cuban government from the OAS, the imposition of trade
restrictions and partial economic sanctions against her.'3 5 After a
lengthy debate on February 27, 1962, the Council decided, by a vote
of four in favor and seven abstentions, against inclusion of the
Cuban note on the Council agenda. 13  However, one reason for-
warded for this rejection was that the General Assembly had already
debated substantially the same Cuban charges without taking any
formal action.13 7  Another rationale for inaction, forwarded in
Council debate, was that the Council decision in the prior Dominican
debate had set a precedent that non-military measures could be under-
taken by a regional organization without prior Council approval. 138
The United States' conception of the limited scope of "enforcement
action" was reinforced.
The Dominican precedent was again invoked a few days later
when the Council included on the agenda the Cuban request for an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on three
legal questions. One question was addressed to the scope of the
expression "enforcement action" in article 53, that is, if it included
134U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1962, at 82
(S/5080) (1962) (Cuban note dated Feb. 22, 1962).
135 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note
90, at 159-62.
136 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 991st meeting (S/PV.991) (1962).
137U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 16th Sess., 1st Comm., Plenary 1231st-1243d (1962)
id. Plenary ii04th-il05th (1962).
1
3 8 
CAYNES, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 58
(5th ed. 1960): "The action taken by the Security Council in this [Dominican] case
has established a precedent of great significance in the operation of the Inter-
American system of collective security." Compare Claude, supra note 90.
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the article 41139 measures and if the list of those measures in article
41 was exhaustive. 4 By a vote of four in favor and seven against,
the Council rejected the Cuban bid for resort to the International
Court of Justice.' 4' At the Council meeting the Soviet Union reiter-
ated its earlier argument that if the Security Council did not nullify
the Punta del Este sanctions against Cuba,
then tomorrow similar action may be taken against any other coun-
try of Latin America, Africa, Asia or any continent whose neigh-
bors, upon some pretext or other, having assembled at a regional
meeting, arbitrarily decide to apply to it the machinery of coercion
in the form of enforcement action, thus usurping prerogatives of
the Security Council.
14 2
However, as the voting indicates, the opposing argument that it was
a disguised Soviet move to extend its veto over the OAS activities
which would eventually be extended to all regional organizations
evidently appealed to Nationalist China and all the Western and
Latin American member states. 43 Thus, the Council action, stem-
ming basically from a fear of uncertainty of the Court's opinion,
perhaps strengthens the prior United States stand in the Dominican
case. After the Council voting, the United States' representative
declared that by rejecting the Cuban proposal, the Security Council
had "forthrightly, resolutely and decisively upheld the integrity and
independence of regional organizations." 144
A few months later, in October 1962, in the face of the Cuban
missile crisis,145 the initial measures taken unilaterally by the United
States were endorsed by the regional organization, after the Council
of the OAS acting as a provisional Organ of Consultation recom-
mended in a resolution that "the member states, in accordance with
articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist-
ance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the
139 U.N. CHARTER art. 41, provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of com-
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
140 See generally U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 992d-998th meetings
(S/PV.992-998) (1962). See U.N. Doc. No. S/5086 (1962); U.N. Doc. No.
S/5088 (1962) (Cuban letters) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/5095 (1962) (draft resolution
as contained in March '19 letter from the Cuban Representative).
141U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 998th meeting 21, 28 (S/PV.998)
(1962).
142 Id. 991st meeting 10 (S/PV.991).
1'3Id. 993d meeting 14-15 (S/PV.993); id. 998th meeting 14-15, 29 (S/PV.998)
(United States position); id. 994th meeting 10 (S/PV.994) (Chilean position);
id. 995th meeting 13 '(S/PV.995) (French position) ; id. 6-7 (Chinese position).
1' Id. 998th meeting 30 (S/PV.998).
145 See generally ABEL, THE MISSILE CRSISs (1966).
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use of armed force.""'4 When the Security Council convened in an
emergency session to consider the question,'147 the uppermost concern
of the members was naturally with the utmost gravity of the situa-
tion. Therefore the question of the OAS-United Nations relation-
ship was virtually cast aside in favor of finding a solution to the
explosive situation. The outcome was that although military meas-
ures had been undertaken and at the Council debate the question of
prior Security Council authorization had also been raised, the OAS
action was not seriously challenged by any member state. 48
Finally, following the decision of the Ninth Meeting of Con-
sultation 49 to apply even more severe diplomatic and economic
measures than had been previously imposed against the Cuban gov-
ernment,' the Secretary General of the OAS, pursuant to article 54,
informed the Security Council of this decision, and the Council never
even discussed the issue.
C. The Dominican Case
On May 1, 1965, the Soviet representative addressed a letter to
the President of the Security Council asking for an urgent Council
meeting on the Dominican situation.' 5 ' The Security Council started
discussing the Dominican situation on May 3. It held more meetings
on this question (twenty-eight in all, from May 3-25, June 3-31, and
14
6 
See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 164-65 (1966) '(text of the resolution).
147U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 1022d-1025th meetings (S/PV.1022-
1025) (1962).
1
48 See MacDonald, The Developing Relationship Between Superior and Subordinate
Political Bodies at the International Level: A Note on the Experience of the United
Nations and the Organization of American States, 2 CAN. YB, INT'L L. 21, 45-49
(1964). Cf. INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op.
cit. supra, note 146, at 165:
The express mention of Articles 6 and 8 might lead to the impression that
this was a collective action, by the Organ of Consultation .... However,
this was not the case. Rather it was a sui generis way of exercising self-
defense .... Above all, it [this view] is corroborated by the fact that the
Organ of Consultation limited itself to "recommending" the measures to be
adopted by the member states; that is, it did not "agree" to apply measures
in this case of self-defense, as it had in other cases. In reality the only
collective action discernible in the October 23 resolution is the decision to
recommend the exercise of self-defense.
14 Held in Washington, D.C. on July 21-26, 1964.
15 0 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, Op. Cit. supra
note 146, at 166-70, for the measures undertaken.
15 U.N. Doc. No. S/6316 (1965). See also U.N. Doc. S/6317 (1965) (another
letter) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/6310 ('1965) (letter from the permanent representative of
the United States to the President of the Security Council informing him of the
United Nations action); U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6313, S/6315 (1965) (OAS Council
Communications sent pursuant to article 54 of the United Nations Charter); U.N.
Doc. No. S/6314 (1965) (text of a note addressed by the Cuban Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations drawing attention to
the threat to the people caused by the United States' action).
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July 20-26, 1965) than on all the others pertaining to Latin America
discussed in the preceding section combined.
On the question of regional competence versus that of the
United Nations, the Council debates show an interesting but fairly
predictable pattern of alignments and positions. The Soviet Union,
supported by Cuba, championed the cause of the United Nations
whose authority, it asserted, should remain unimpaired by regional
actions. The United States, supported by Bolivia, contended that
since prior precedents had already recognized that OAS autonomy
extended to a wide range of activities as long as they were in con-
formity with the United Nations Charter, the Council should let the
OAS handle this situation and not disturb the existing relationship.
Nationalist China, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands took
a pro-regional position, while Uruguay joined the Afro-Asian states
-Jordan, Ivory Coast and Malaysia -to express concern at the
possible encroachment by regional organizations on member states'
rights, especially those of small states, were the Council not to safe-
guard their interests in the international forum. France was also close
to this position.
The Council discussion centered on three main issues: access to
the international arena; United Nations action in the specific case;
and the scope of "enforcement action" as it related to the establish-
ment of the Inter-American Armed Force.
1. Access to International Arenas
Welcoming the Council debate on the Dominican question,
Ambassador Stevenson reminded the members of article 33 which
prescribed procedures and priorities for dealing with local disputes,
but did not "derogate from the authority of this Council.""' While
conceding that the Council had such competence, Ambassador Stev-
enson contended that the question of competence was not at issue in
the Dominican discussion. Even though it had competence, he said,
the Council
should not seek to duplicate or interfere with actions through re-
gional arrangements so long as those actions remain effective and are
consistent with our Charter. The purpose of the United Nations
Charter will hardly be served if two international organizations are
seeking to do things in the same place with the same people at the
same time.153
Notwithstanding the prior seizure of the Dominican question




1d. 1217th meeting 6-7 (S/PV.1217). See also id. 1213th meeting 4 (S/PV.1213).
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by the OAS, no member ever challenged15 4 the Council's competence
to consider it. Several representatives went on record to reinforce
their stand that no regional action could diminish or impair the
United Nations authority to consider a situation that might endanger
international peace and security or threaten the interests of small
states.' 5" Among those members asserting this position, Uruguay, a
Latin American state and an OAS member, was in the forefront.
Addressing the Security Council meeting on May 4, the Uruguayan
Representative said:
[My] delegation has no doubt as to the competence of the Security
Council to inquire now and in the future into any dispute or situa-
tion the continuation of which may be a threat to the maintenance
of peace and international security, even if the dispute is at the time
under consideration by a regional body. This authority, which the
provisions of article 52, paragraph 4, and articles 34 and 35 of the
Charter of the United Nations dearly confer upon the Council, is
even more appropriate when the situation involved appears prima
facie to contravene international law, and in particular, article 2,paragraphs 4 and 7, of the Charter of the United Nations and articles
15 and 17 of the Organization of American States. 156
Intervening in the debate at a later date to submit a draft resolution,
he reiterated his position that articles 33 and 55(2) were not appli-
cable to the Dominican type situation since they related to "the type
of international dispute amenable to conciliation and pacific settle-
ment, and not to situations like this one, where charges of aggression
have been made." 157 Addressing himself to the broader question of
access to the international arena, the Uruguayan Representative
quoted with approval from his predecessor's speech to the General
Assembly in September 1954, on the Guatemalan case "about a
precedent created as a result of a negative attitude on the part of the
Security Council":"'
My country combines membership in the United Nations with
membership in the Organization of American States, in the belief
that the principles of the regional system and the safeguards which
it offers cannot be invoked in order to prevent States from having
direct and immediate access to the jurisdiction of the United
Nations or to deprive them, no matter how temporarily, of the pro-
5 4 
See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra
note 146, at 171-79 (summary of OAS action); Organization of American States,
Annual Report of the Secretary General 1964-1965 (summary of OAS action). For a
brief chronology of the OAS activities in the Dominican crisis see 17 AMERICAS
42-43 (May 1965); id. at 42-45 (June 1965); id. at 39-40 (July 1965); id. at
40-41 (Aug. 1965); id. at 41-42 (Sept. 1965); id. at 41 '(Oct. '1965); id. at 43
Nov. 1965); id. at 41-42 (Dec. 1965); id. at 42-43 (March 1966) ; id. at 39 (April
1966) ; id. at 45-46 (June 1966) ; id. at 45 (July 1966) ; id. at 43 (Aug. 1966); id.
at 44 (Nov. 1966).
155 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1200th meeting 1-2
,(S/PV.1200) (1965) (Jordanian Representative's address).
15 6 Id. 1198th meeting 6 (S/PV.1198).
1
57 Id. 1204th meeting 5 (S/PV.1204).
'5 8 Id. 1198th meeting 7 (S/PV.1198).
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tection of the agencies of the world community. The legal protec-
tion afforded by both systems should be combined, never substituted
for one another.
The negative decision adopted by the Security Council con-
stitutes a very serious precedent for the countries of America since
its result must be to diminish or delay, so far as they are concerned,
the respective applications of the jurisdictional safeguards against
aggression established in the Charter of the United Nations. 15 9
And once again he expressed his belief that all members shared "a
desire to examine unequivocally the authority of the Council."'
160
At various points in the Council debates representatives of Jordan,'"
Malaysia, 16 2 Cuba,163 the Soviet Union,' 64 Ivory Coast,' 6 5 and the
Netherlands,' 6 6 among others, supported this position.
2. The United Nations Action
Unlike the past instances in which the Council had "taken note"
of the OAS action or endorsed the OAS moves to reach a pacific
settlement of the conflict, or asked for a report of its action and
outcome before taking any steps, in the Dominican crisis, the Security
Council unanimously adopted a resolution on May 14, 1965, which
invited the Secretary General "to send, as an urgent measure, a rep-
resentative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting
to the security Council on the present situation."' 67 It further called
upon "all concerned in the Dominican Republic to cooperate with
the Representative of the Secretary-General in carrying out his
task."' 68 While similar to the Council's earlier resolution during
the 1954 Guatemalan conflict, the present one also called for a strict
cease fire. Pursuant to the Security Council resolution, the Secretary-
General appointed Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre as his representative
to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Mayobre arrived in Santo Domingo
on May 18,169 but before that, on May 15, an advance United
Nations party had already arrived there 70 and the United Na-
tions machinery was set in motion. 7 '. Sending a United Nations
1
59 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 9th Sess., Plenary 481, at 16-17 (1954).
160U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1214th meeting 10 (S/PV.1214)
(1965).
161 Id. 1204th meeting 7 (S/PV.1204).
162 Id. 1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216).
163Id. 1198th meeting 16 (S/PV.1198) ; id. 1213th meeting 9, 13 (S/PV.1213).
164 Id. 1198th meeting 29 (S/PV.1198).
165Id. 1223d meeting 3-5 (S/PV.1223).
166 Id. 1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216).
167Id. 1208th meeting 3 (S/PV.1208) (UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 203) (1965).
(adopted on Jordan's motion).
168 Ibid.
'16 U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6365, S/6369 (1965). These contain the Secretary General's
report on the activities of his Representative, Dr. Mayobre.
170 U.N. Doc. No. S/6358 (1965).
171 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6365, Annex (1965), containing an appeal from the Secretary
General to all the parties concerned for an immediate cessation of hostilities.
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representative into the Dominican Republic, thus asserting its
physical presence in a conflict that was being handled by the
OAS from its very inception, 172 was something new. It may be
recalled that not only was the OAS Secretary-General on the
scene, 17 but that the OAS had also dispatched a five-member special
committee to the Dominican Republic to find a peaceful solution to
the crisis174 and had from the outset kept the Security Council fully
informed of its activities. 175 The United Nations resolution did not
even mention the OAS and its efforts.
The United Nations action seems to have been prompted by
several compelling factors. To mention a few: more than two weeks
had already passed since the conflict started and its end seemed
nowhere in sight; the "Constitutional Government," a party to the
conflict, continued accusing the OAS of its inability to resolve the
Dominican crisis because of its domination by the United States and
its resulting bias against the rebels ;17 and finally, on May 14, the
Council was facing a serious and apparently deteriorating situation
in the Dominican Republic. 77 Thus, notwithstanding a parallel of
political and ideological confrontations in the Dominican Republic
with the prior 1954 Guatemalan crisis, the urgency in the Dominican
conflict was primarily instrumental in the unanimous adoption of
the Council resolution. 17 This urgency was created by the prolonged
struggle' 79 coupled with a possibility of a Communist threat in the
Dominican Republic. Had the threat been a certainty, as in the
Guatemalan situation, the United States might have been more
insistent in demanding that the issue be handled by the OAS.
1 7 2 
See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, op. cit. supra note 154, at 1-6, 18-19
(brief report of the OAS activities).
173 Id. at 19. On April 30 the Council of the OAS authorized its Secretary-General to go
to the Dominican Republic "to indicate the presence of the Oraiztion of American
States, which the serious Dominican situation requires," and to help the Dean of
the Diplomatic Corps. and others in finding a peaceful settlement.
174 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6319 '(1965), containing the May 1 resolution of the Tenth
Meeting establishing the Special Committee consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Guatemala and Peru, and instructing the Committee to proceed immediately to Santo
Domingo to obtain "as a matter of urgency a ceasefire," and offer its good offices for
a peaceful solution.
175 See note 172 supra, where pursuant to article 54 of the United Nations Charter, the
OAS began informing the United Nations Secretary-General of the Council action,
and subsequently of the actions before the Tenth Meeting.
17
6 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1208th meeting 2 (PU/1208)
(1965), which contains a telegram by Dr. Jottin Cury, Minister of Foreign Affairs
in the Constitutional Government, requesting an emergency meeting of the Security
Council, since "It must be acknowledged with regret that the Organization of Amer-
ican States has shown that it is incapable of resolving the Dominican situation and
of opposing the wishes of the United States."
7
7 Id. at 1-2.
178 See notes 6-16 supra and accompanying text on the alleged threat of a communist
take-over.
179 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1216th meeting 17-18
(S/PV.1216) (1965) (Malaysian Representative's remarks implying that it was the
emergency situation that had brought about the United Nations action).
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Pro-regionalists felt that the United Nations action was an
awkward and unnecessary move that might further complicate the
situation. Thus, while conceding that "the right of its member states
to resort to the world organization is explicitly recognized in its
Charter" and that "all participation by the world organization in
local matters" is not precluded, Garcia Amador, the director of legal
affairs of the Pan American Union, found the United Nations action
unjustified in the Dominican case.' s° He said that in consonance
with article 52, in the past instances "the world organization has
repeatedly abstained from intervening in local disputes and situations
when the regional agency has been taking action."'' Since it was a
case of concurrent jurisdiction,
intervention by the world organization while the regional agency
is making all possible efforts to reach a pacific settlement is a form
of "abuse of power." The Security Council could very well, as it
has done repeatedly in the past, have allowed time for the regional
action to produce results, especially inasmuch as some results have
already been obtained. Furthermore, by the date of the Security
Council's decision, the danger of the situation's affecting inter-
national peace and security had been averted. It is evident, then,
that the Security Council made premature and undue use of its
powers.18
2
In its second report submitted to the Tenth Meeting on May 19,
1965, i8' the OAS Special Committee went to considerable length to
criticize the United Nations action. In part it said:
this was the first time such an interference between the world
agency of the United Nations and of a regional organization of
American states had been recorded....
It is essential to mention or to emphasize that the United
Nations began a procedure of this significance without noting the
serious consequences that this step would have to the prejudice of
the action initiated by a regional agency.
It can be said that with the intervention of the United Nations
the progress of the negotiations conducted by the special committee
was greatly obstructed....
In order that the OAS may achieve its objectives within the
principles of the inter-American system, the Special Committee feels
it essential to request the United Nations Security Council to sus-
pend all action until the regional procedures have been exhausted,
as established in article 52.2 of the United Nations Charter .... 1
8 4
180 Garcia Amador, The Dominican Situation: The Jurisdiction of the Regional Organ-
ization, 17 AMERICAS 1, 3 (July 1965).
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
1' U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6370, S/6370/Add. 1 (1965).
'"U.N. Doc. No. S/6370/Add. 10-14 (1965). See also U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.
REc. 20th year, 1213th meeting 13 (S/PV.1213) (1965), where the Cuban Repre-
sentative was critical:
With the collaboration of the OAS... an attempt is being made to set the
seal on the aggression committed against a sovereign State Member of the
United Nations and establish a kind of arbitrary trusteeship, which is an
extraordinarily dangerous precedent for the countries of America and, in
general, for small nations throughout the world.
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On May 20, 1965, the Tenth Meeting adopted a resolution
thanking the Special Committee for its work, asking the Secretary-
General of the OAS to represent it in the Dominican Republic, and
instructing him to coordinate with the representative of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, where appropriate to the attainment
of the objectives set forth in this resolution.' 85
The next day the United States proposed a draft resolution in
the Security Council containing in an operative paragraph, the re-
quest that:
the representative appointed by the Secretary-General, in carrying
out the responsibilities assigned to him by the Security Council...
co-ordinate with the Secretary-General of the Organization of Amer-
ican States in light of the resolution adopted by the Organization of
American States on 20 May 1965.186
On May 22 the United States' Representative criticized a draft
Uruguayan resolution for failing to acknowledge OAS efforts in
negotiating a cease fire, for not mentioning the OAS Secretary-Gen-
eral's appointment as its representative in the Dominican Republic,
for not recognizing the OAS decision to cooperate with the United
Nations and for not referring to United Nations reciprocity.' 87
Similarly, he criticized the French draft resolution 8 8 which would
recall the earlier Security Council resolution and, without any refer-
ence to the OAS activities or the Meeting decision, requested "that
the suspension of hostilities in Santo Domingo be transformed into
a permanent cease fire."' 89 He said: "We consider that ... a refer-
ence to the OAS decisions is the minimum necessary to reciprocate
the express desire of the OAS to work in cooperation with the
Council."'"9 The Bolivian Representative explained his abstention
in voting on the Uruguayan resolution:
simply because the Uruguayan draft resolution... does not explic-
itly mention the competence of the Organization of American
States to deal with the Dominican situation or the effectiveness of
its work and reduces it from its lofty position to the lowly status
1 8 5U.N. Doc. No. S/6372/Rev. 1 (1965). However, the OAS Secretary-General's re-
port does not even mention the United Nations Security Council action or the
presence of the United Nations observer in the Dominican Republic. See OAS, Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Report of the Secretary-
General of the Organization of American States regarding the Dominican Situation
-Activities from April 29, 1965, until the installation of the Provisional Govern-
ment, OAS OFF. REC. OEA/Ser. F/11.10, Doc. 405, 1 Nov. 1965 (Pan. Am. Union
1965).
186 U.N. Doc. No. S/6373 (1965).
187 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1216th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.1216)
(1965).
188 Id. 1217th meeting 6 (S/PV.1217).
189 U.N. Doc. No. S/6376 (1965).




of a fact-finding mission invited merely to co-operate with other
organizations.' 9
The French resolution was adopted by the Council with the United
States' Representative abstaining.
192
Subsequently, on May 25, in a letter to the President of the
Security Council, thirteen Latin American States said that:
In accordance with article 52, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the
United Nations, which Member States are bound to uphold, every
effort should be made to encourage action by regional agencies for
the pacific settlement of local disputes.'l9
At its Fourteenth Conference held in May 1965, the Inter-
American Bar Association also went on record declaring that:
the Organization of American States has original jurisdiction over
the situation in the Dominican Republic and no other international
organization has competence to interfere in the case until the O.A.S.
submits it to the United Nations Security Council.'
9 4
In the United States Senate Senator Dodd was critical of the
United Nations' presence in the Dominican Republic. He said,
The governments of the Americas resent the intrusion of the
United Nations observers because they are convinced that it will only
undercut their position and complicate their task. They feel that this
is their problem, and that they are determined to deal with it on
their own.
This is a most wholesome and welcome reaction. "'7
Speaking later he said,
While the United Nations has shown itself to be completely in-
effective in upholding the rule of law against the transgressions of
the Communist States on the one hand and the Afro-Asian states
on the other hand, while it has failed to intervene where it could
and should have intervened, the United Nations Secretariat and the
majority of the General Assembly apparently seem bent on intrud-
ing themselves into the affairs of the American states, where their
presence is not needed and not wanted. l9 6
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the United Nations' pres-
ence in the Dominican Republic was generally considered a healthy
development. To illustrate, the Jordinian Representative felt that
the United Nations presence was useful in assuring the Dominican
people of the world community's concern and bringing moral pres-
191 Id. 1216th meeting 16 (S/PV.1216).
192 Adopted by a vote of 10-0-1 (Resolution 205) (1965).
'93 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6409 (1965) (letter from the Representatives of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru).
194 The Conference was held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 22-29, 1965. For a report
on the said declaration, see Finch, Inter-American Bar Association, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 80, 81 (1966).
19 111 CONG. REc. 11029 (daily ed. May 24, 1965).
196 Id. at 14774 '(daily ed. June 30, 1965).
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sure to bear on opponents. 9" Speaking in the Council debate on
July 22, 1965, the French Representative said:
My delegation notes with satisfaction that the Secretary-General's
Special Representative does not remain a passive observer. In con-
formity with the spirit of this mandate, Mr. Mayobre has felt it his
duty to be an active witness, moving about whenever necessary and
investigating personally or through his colleagues the incidents and
facts brought to his attention.19 8
It may be recalled that the Security Council did not dispatch the
United Nations' Commission on Human Rights to verify the alleged
violation of human rights being committed by the "Government of
National Reconstruction" and to take appropriate measures to stop
them as requested by the "Constitutional Government."' 9 9  The
Council sent a special Secretary-General's Representative instead,
leaving the question of human rights to the Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights,"° ' and leaving some question as to the
scope of the functions of the Secretary-General's Representative. The
Secretary-General clarified his task on June 11, 1965, when he said
in the Council meeting:
The present mandate [under resolution 203 (1965)] involves ob-
servation and reporting. This does not, in my view, or that of my
Representative, include the actual investigation of complaints and
charges about specific incidents and the necessary verification of
information concerning them which involves investigation, other
than incidents of overt firing which constitute clear breaches of the
cease-fire.
20 '
However, the United Nations' Representative did investigate
one specific instance of alleged mass executions by the officers of the
"Government of National Reconstruction" and sent a report of his
197 U.N. SECUI TY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1213th meeting 14-15 (S/PV.1213)
(1965).
198 Id. 1231st meeting 5 (S/P.V.1231).
1'9Id. 1208th meeting 2-3 (S/PV.1208). Later, in two communications of May 25 and
May 29, the request was repeated. See id. 1220th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.1220), for the
United States Representative's remarks that they would not be a fit subject for the
Security Council Meeting.
200 See U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6404, S/6404/Add. 1, 3 (1965), for a report on the arrival
of the Officers of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Santo Do-
mingo. The Soviet Representative still insisted that the United Nations should con-
duct the inquiry itself and not transfer it to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. See U.N. SECURrT COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1223d meeting
6 (S/PV.1223) (1965). See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6431 (1965), for the report
that both parties affirmed their intention to respect human rights and agreed to pro-
vide their facilities to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
2°'U.N. SECuRTY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 20th year, 1223d meeting 2 (S/PV.1223)
(1965). But See id. 1227th meeting 5 (S/P.V.1227) (President's statement of
18 June 1965):
Some members would like to ... see the [Secretary-General's] representa-
tive take on a more intensive role in investigating complaints. Several other
members expressed themselves against it because they thought it would cause
duplication. I have, therefore, not been able to detect a consensus in the
Council to the effect of giving the Secretary-General's representative a more
elaborate mandate of investigation than up to now.
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findings to the United Nations Secretary-General as well as the
chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
20 2
The Inter-American Commission took appropriate action in the
matter.2 03 In his summary report to the Security Council's discussion
during July 20-26, 1965, the Council President at the last meeting
of the Council said that members had condemned gross violations
of human rights in the Dominican Republic and had expressed the
desire that such violations should cease. He also expressed the
Council's desire to continue watching the situation in the Dominican
Republic closely and to continue to receive the Secretary General's
reports to the Council on the Dominican situation.2 04
Finally, on October 14, 1966, the Secretary General informed
the Security Council that the foreign minister of the Dominican
Republic had, in a communication to him, expressed his country's
appreciation to the United Nations "for its interest in the restoration
of peace and harmony in the Dominican Republic" and had stated
that in the Dominican Government's view "the objectives of the
Security Council having been achieved, it would be advisable to
withdraw the United Nations' Mission from the Dominican Repub-
lic."20 5 The Secretary-General therefore initiated arrangements for
the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in the Dominican
Republic.
3. The Inter-American Peace Force20 6
In the Council debates the Soviet Union 0 7 and Cuba20 8 led the
attack against the dispatch of the American troops in the initial
stages of the Dominican crisis, contending that the article 53 require-
ment had not been met.
202U.N. Doc. No. S/6432 (1965). See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6430 (1965).
23See U.N. Doc. No. S/6443 (1965).
2 04 U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1233d meeting 1-2 (S/PV.1233)
(1965).
205 U.N. Doc. No. S/7552 (1966).
206 See generally Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Legal
Aspects, HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS 32 (1966) ; WARSCHAVER, THE INTER-AMERICAN
MILITARY FORCE (1966). The strength of the United States' force at its peak was
21,500. Other countries sent the following contingents to constitute the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Force: Brazil, 1140; Honduras, 250; Nicaragua, 166; Costa Rica, 21
(policemen) ; El Salvador, 3. 17 AMERICAS 44 (June 1965). For the beginning of
the withdrawal of the peace force on June 28, 1965, see 18 id. at 43 (Aug. 1966),
and for its completion on September 21, 1966, see 18 id. at 44 (Nov. 1966).
07 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1196th meeting 44 '(S/PV.1196)
(1965) ; id. 1198th meeting 2 (S/PV.1198) ; id. 1200th meeting 32 (S/PV.1200) ;
id. 1202d meeting 10-11 (S/PV.1202) (where the Soviet Representative asked,"where is the [Council's] mandate for the carrying out of military operations and
enforcement action against the Dominican Republic?").
208 id. 1196th meeting 24 (S/PV.1196): ("a special OAS mission left for Santo Do-
mingo in an attempt to legalize the United States military occupation.") See also id.
1198th meeting 21 '(S/PV.1198).
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Following the OAS decision on May 6 to establish an Inter-
American Armed Force2"9 and the steps it took later to implement
that decision,210 Cuba and the Soviet Union mounted their attack
on the alleged illegal nature of the United States and the OAS
action. 1 The Soviet Representative, for example, contended that:
The Security Council has still not been told on what basis the
occupation troops are in the Dominican Republic, or who instructed
the regional agency to engage in actions involving the use of armed
force.... No kind of effort to replace or circumvent the Security
Council in international affairs is justified. 212
Later in the debate, reiterating his earlier stand he asked,
"Where is the mandate which the United States requires under
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter?" 213 He characterized the
United States and the OAS actions as "an open challenge. . . to the
authority of the Security Council," that constituted "an act of un-
paralleled illegality and arbitrariness which will led to the under-
mining of the very foundation of the United Nations Charter. '14
He also criticized the OAS.15 resolution as having violated Articles
2, 39 and 53 of the United Nations Charter and Article 15 of the
OAS Charter.21
The Cuban Representative emphasized that the act of establish-
ing the Inter-American Peace Force not only detracted from the OAS
objectives, because, he alleged, it was done in order to legalize the
United States action, but was "a flagrant violation" of Article 43
of the United Nations Charter which authorizes only the Security
Council to organize forces for maintaining international peace and
security. 17 He ridiculed the United States' contention that since the
OAS did not impose binding legal obligations on its members to use
W9 See U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6333, S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965) (text of the resolution adopted
by the Tenth Meeting on May 6, 1965, on the formation of an Inter-American Force
as recommended by the Special Committee).
210 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6377/Rev. 1 (1965) (resolution adopted at the Thirteenth
Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting on May 22, 1965, on the working and function
of the Inter-American Armed Force, signed at Santo Domingo May 23, 1965).
211 However, note the argument that since the force was created "to provide a means for
preserving the peace," the OAS action to establish the force could be compared with
the United Nations creation of U.N.E.F. and U.N.I.C.Y.P. and thus could be termed
a "legitimate device." McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American Dilemma,
4 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 178, 186-87 (1966). See also Amador, supra note 180, at 3
(United Nations Secretary-General's reaction to the establishment of the force).
2 12 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1208th meeting 13 (S/PV.1208)
(1965).
213Id. 1218th meeting 6 (S/PV.1218).
2
14Ibid. See also id. 1213th meeting 20 (S/PV.1213); id. 1216th meeting 11, 13, 15
(S/PV.1216) ; id. 1220th meeting 22 (S/PV.1220).
215 The Soviet Representative referred to the OAS as the "so-called Organization of
American States," in id. 1227th meeting 12 (S/PV. 1227).
21GId. 1220th meeting 7-9 (S/PV.1220). See U.N. Doc. No. S/6411 (1965) (text of
the Soviet Government's statement).




armed force, the Inter-American Force did not constitute an enforce-
ment action. He called it merely a "euphemism" that had been
employed to flout obligations under Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter and Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
He further argued that the very presence of foreign military forces
in a sovereign state constituted an act of a coercive nature and made
the measure "an enforcement action." 
2 18
In response to the Soviet-Cuban attack, the United States' Rep-
resentative reminded the Council that from a study of the objectives
of the Inter-American Peace Force, the OAS action could not be
termed an enforcement action. 219  He was referring to the "sole
purpose" of the force as declared in the OAS resolution establishing
it, which was to cooperate
in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic,
in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of
peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of demo-
cratic institutions. 22
0
The United States Representative emphasized that since the
Force was established voluntarily and solely for the purpose men-
tioned above and was not designed to act against the Dominican
Republic or the Dominican people, "the requirements of the United
Nations Charter are those set forth in Articles 52 and 54 rather than
in Article 53." 21 He went on to attack the Soviet motive in chal-
lenging the OAS action in these words:
the Soviet Government objects to peace-keeping operations under
the auspices of the OAS, but it also objects to such operations un-
dertaken at the recommendation of the General Assembly. It insists
that only the Security Council, where it has a veto- used over a
hundred times- can take action to keep the peace. In short, the
Soviet Union is trying to establish a de facto situation where inter-
national peace-keeping operations can take place only at the pleas-
ure of the Soviet Union. Having in mind the explosive and danger-
ous Soviet doctrine of so-called wars of liberation, we can imagine
how many and what kind of peace-keeping operations would take
place under these circumstances. 2 22
Earlier in the debate Ambassador Stevenson justified the OAS action
under article 52.223 He observed that since the issue of "enforcement
action" had been "considered exhaustively in the Security Council in
21B Ibid.
2 19 1d. 1220th meeting 16-17 (S/PV.1220).
220 U.N. Doc. No. S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965).
22U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1220th meeting 17 (S/PV.1220)
'(1965).
Ibid.
lId. 1200th meeting 33-34 (S/PV.1200).
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the past" it hardly required reopening. 2 4 Commenting on the sig-
nificance of the historic act - the creation of the Inter-American
Peace Force - the Secretary-General of the OAS said that the objec-
tives for which the force was created "clearly come within the
broad provisions of the Charter of the OAS concerning matters
affecting the peace and security of the continent. ' 22  Referring to
the objectives of the Force he also implied that the Force did not
constitute "enforcement action."
It is perhaps ironic that in late July 1965, when the "Constitu-
tional Government" requested that the Security Council to withdraw
the "so-called Inter-American Peace Force" from the Dominican
Republic "without further delay," 226 the "Government of National
Reconstruction" was making a similar plea for the immediate evacu-
ation of the Force from the Dominican Republic." 7
The United Nations Secretary-General is said to have viewed
the OAS peace-keeping action "as possibly establishing an embar-
rassing precedent inasmuch as the League of Arab States or the
Organization of African Unity might invoke similar rights." 2
28
The Soviet Representative had the last say in the Council debate
when on July 26, 1965, he alleged that during the Council discussion
it had been "amply demonstrated" that the OAS action was taken
"in violation of clear-cut provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations forbidding regional organizations to take any enforcement
action without the authorization of the Security Council." 229
224 Ibid.
=U.N. Doc. No. S/6381, at 3-4 (1965).
2 2 6U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1231st meeting 10 (S/PV.1231)
(1965). See id. at 2, for the communication of July 20, 1965, from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Constitutional Government to the Secretary-General:
The Constitutional Government reminds you, Mr. Secretary-General, and
the Security Council that it represents a State Member of the United
Nations and as such is entitled to call upon the competence of the Organ-
ization in respect to measures to guarantee respect for the sovereignty of
free peoples and to safeguard international peace and security, which today
are so endangered in the Dominican Republic through military inter-
vention.
See also id. 1232d meeting 2-4 (S/PV.1232), for another plea from the represen-
tative of the Constitutional Government for the withdrawal of the Force.
227
Id. 1232d meeting 6 (S/PV. 1232). The representative of the Government of
National Reconstruction argued that since the Dominican conflict was a civil war,
pursuant to Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and Article 17 of the
OAS Charter, neither of these organizations could "intervene." Thus the element
of consent which the International Court of Justice considered was an important
element in considering the U.N.E.F. activities as non-enforcement action was lacking
in the Dominican situation. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article
17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), [1962) I.C.J. REP. 151, 170-71 (advisory
opinion).
228 Quoted by Amador, supra note 180, at 3.





For a better comprehension of the problems posed in the pre-
ceding discussion it will be useful to keep a proper focus on the
conditioning factors in the Dominican crisis. Some of these factors
are: decentralized structure of the world community and its ideolog-
ical bifurcation and nuances as reflected at the United Nations; con-
flicting and contending interests and preferences of member states
- the Latin American states' desire to retain their right to bring a
dispute before the United Nations untrammeled and at the same
time to escape the paralyzing outcome of the Council veto; the
United States' dominant role within the Inter-American framework
as contrasted with its ineffective position in the veto ridden Council;
the Soviet endeavor to extend the Council veto to the OAS actions;
and several member states' concern to balance these conflicting inter-
ests by a contextual analysis of a specific situation.
IV. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
The Dominican conflict did not resolve the question of the
delineation of competence, demarcation, and scope of authority
between the United Nations and the OAS. The tenor of the United
States' argument was that the OAS, "a recognized arm of the United
Nations," 23 0 and the United Nations should be mutually strength-
ening and reinforcing and not competing and conflicting, and that
OAS actions that are consistent with the purposes of the United
Nations should be encouraged.23  While several Council members
preferred the concept of coordination and cooperation between the
two bodies,218 to a possible conflict between them, they found it hard
to apply the abstract principle of cooperation and coordination to the
specific situation. The statement by the Representative of Uruguay
that he did not believe that this was the most "propitious occasion"
for resolving the question of competence between regional bodies
and the United Nations 23 3 sums up the majority view in the Council.
Ambiguities in the OAS and the United Nations Charter pro-
visions, especially the lack of an authoritative interpretation of article
53, are bound to leave an observer uncertain about the way the next
case will be decided by the Council. Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo of
230 Id. 1208th meeting 10 (S/PV.1208).
231See, e.g., id. 1217th meeting at 6 (S/PV.1217). (Ambassador Stevenson's state-
ment).
232See id. 1214th meeting 2, 17 (S/PV.1214) (statement by the Representative of
Uruguay); id. at 17 (statement by the Representative of the United Kingdom);
id. 1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216) (statement by the Representative of The
Netherlands) ; id. at 18 (statement by the Representative of Malaysia) ; id. 1212th
meeting 26 (S/PV.1212) (statement by the Representative of Ivory Coast).
3
2Id. 1214th meeting 12 (S/PV.1214).
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Colombia, Chairman of the Commission which dealt with "Regional
Arrangements" at the San Francisco conference,2"' suggests that:
There is a dear distinction for the reader of the Charter between
the measures of Article 41 (enforcement action) which are not
coercive, in the sense that they lack the element of physical violence
that is closely identified with military action, and those of Article
42. Enforcement action, with the use of physical force, is obviously
the prerogative of the Security Council, with a single exception:
individual or collective self-defense. But the other measures, those
of Article 41, are not; it may even be said that it is within the
power of any State- without necessarily violating the purposes,
principles, or provisions of the Charter-to break diplomatic,
consular, and economic relations or to interrupt its communications
with another State. Thus the use of armed force by the American
States is subject to two limitations: they may not use it except in
self-defense, when there has been armed attack, or in other cases of
aggression and threat of aggression, under the authority of the
Security Council.
235
The legal adviser to the United States Department of State,
Leonard Meeker, makes another distinction between "obligatory"
and "recommendatory" measures, contending that "enforcement
action" does not include action which is not obligatory on member
states.30
The Council debates and decisions certainly endorse both Dr.
Lleras' and Meeker's interpretations. This restrictive interpretation
of "enforcement action" coupled with a broad interpretation of
"armed attack" in article 51 will give a regional organization unlim-
ited autonomy to act without Council authorization. This position is
well reflected in a comment made by the then legal adviser to the
United States Department of State, Abram Chayes, in the aftermath
of the Cuban missile crisis. Chayes said that since the Security
Council's responsibility for dealing with threats to the peace is
"primary" and not "exclusive" the United States did not go to the
Security Council "before taking other action to meet the Soviet threat
in Cuba."
He explained this decision thus:
[E]vents since 1945 have demonstrated that the Security Council,
like our own electoral college, was not a viable institution. The
veto has made it substantially useless in keeping the peace.
The withering away of the Security Council has led to a
search for alternative peacekeeping institutions. In the United
Nations itself the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have
filled the void. Regional organizations are another obvious candi-
date.
23 7
234 12 U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 663 (1945).
3 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 190 (1966).
236Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 521 (1961).
27 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 763, 765 (1962).
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This view would also find support in the recent advisory opin-
ion of the International Court of Justice wherein the Court made a
distinction between "primary" and "exclusive" functions to maintain
or restore peace.23  The Court also declared that since the United
Nations operations in the Congo, initiated by the General Assembly,
"did not include a use of armed force against a State which the Secur-
ity Council, under article 39, determined to have committed an act of
aggression or to have breached the peace," they were not enforce-
ment actions.2 9  The Court said further that since the United
Nations armed forces in the Congo were not authorized to take
military action against any state, the United Nations operation "did
not involve preventive or enforcement measures against any state
under Chapter VII" and could not be termed "action" under
article 11.240
Given the stillborn United Nations collective security system,
and the grave financial problems before the United Nations,24' with
their enormous impact on the United Nations peacekeeping func-
tions, the trend seems to be toward an increased regional autonomy.
The unpredictable Council alignments, uncertainty of the Council
action in view of the veto, the recent increase in the number of the
Council membership, and finally the fact that many regional prob-
lems may be best suited to a local settlement,2 42 have further
strengthened the trend.
Among the member states, the United States has, ever since the
1954 Guatemalan crisis, encouraged this trend. The trend may be
criticized on the ground that it detracts from acknowledging the
supremacy of the United Nations. However, since it meets the needs
of the time and can be justified on a reasonable construction of the
United Nations and the OAS Charters, it should be accepted as a
time gap measure, necessary and lawful, until or if collective security
under United Nations auspices becomes practical and real. Special
circumstances of the conflict and urgent situations such as presented
by the 1965 Dominican crisis might in the future, again bring the
238 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 227, at 163.
239 Id. at 177.
240 Ibid.
241 See generally Padelford, Financial Crisis and the Future of the United Nations,
3 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 733 (Falk & Mendlovitz eds. 1966). See also
SINGER, FINANCING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET
PROCESS (1961); R.F. & H.J. Taubenfeld, Independent Revenue for the UN, 18
INT'L ORGN. 241 (1964).
2See, e.g., U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1198th meeting 12
(S/PV.1198) (1965) (Bolivian Representative's Speech); id. 1214th meeting 6-7
(S/PV.1214) (further remarks by the Bolivian Representative) ; id. 1202d meeting
5-6 (S/PV. 1202) (Chinese Representative's address).
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United Nations physical presence into a regional conflict. But as
long as the aforementioned problems at the United Nations and in
the world community exist and as long as extra-legal considerations,
mainly expediency, set the tone for formulating major policies by
national states in the international arena, this trend is almost
irreversible.
Based upon the discussion thus far a few further inquiries con-
cerning basic community policies are pertinent here. The first ques-
tion pertains to the proper decision-making authority to commit
armed force in response to an alleged "armed attack." Latin America
is known for military dictatorships, some of which often resort to the
magic device of dubbing their opponents "Communists" to suppress
them and thus strengthen their otherwise teetering political power.
Would the United States insist on making the initial decision to send
forces to a Latin American country when the incumbent regime asks
for assistance on the ground that it is the target of an "armed attack,"
and is likely to be taken over by Communists? 43 In a press interview
on May 8, 1965, Secretary Rusk responded to a similar question.
He said that since the United States action in the Dominican Repub-
lic was related specifically to the facts of that situation, it would
serve "no useful purpose to speculate on possible responses to any
future events elsewhere, particularly when we have no basis for
expecting them to occur. ' 244 Three weeks later, in another inter-
view, he again said that one should not "generalize on a world-wide
basis on the experience of the Dominican Republic." 1
45
These statements do not provide a satisfactory answer to the
question posed. Furthermore, in view of the United States action in
the Dominican Republic and the subsequent House Resolution,
would not some unscrupulous military juntas justify their military
assistance to other juntas to quash their political oppositions on a






43See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 26185 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965) (remarks by Senator
Morse):
Suppose conditions should worsen in Bolivia, now ruled by a military
junta. Suppose groups of people in Bolvia should rise up to overthrow
that military junta. Suppose that military junta should make a plea to the
United States for military assistance and intervention. Are we going in,
Mr. Rusk and Mr. Mann?
See also id. at 8911 (daily ed. May 3, 1965) (earlier statements by Senator Morse)
Matthews, Santo Domingo and "Non-intervention", N.Y. Times, May 10, 1965,
p. 32, col. 5 (city ed.).
24 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 843 (1965).
245 Id. at 949.
246 See, e.g., Kent, New "Axis" is Eyed: Restless Neighbors Worry Uruguayans, Wash-
ington Post, Aug. 11, 1966, p. E6, col. 1-2.
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Perhaps the alternative is that the Organ of Consultation alone
must determine in the first instance whether there was an "armed
attack," and second, if the "armed attack" affected hemispheric
peace or threatened the political integrity of a member state before
allowing the commitment of armed forces in a Dominican-type situa-
tion. It should, however, be recalled that the OAS action in the
Dominican crisis was not taken under the Rio Treaty. The Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was convoked under
Article 39 of the OAS Charter, to consider the "serious situation"
created by armed strife in the Dominican Republic; 241 it was not
convened as the Organ of Consultation.
The second question pertains to the application of the doctrine
of sovereign equality of nation states,24 and the right of states to
self-determination,24 to which all member states have at least given
unqualified verbal adherence. This verbal adherence would certainly
demand that the right of a nation state to adopt its own political
institutions be respected. To illustrate, the United Nations recog-
nized this right in the 1956 Hungarian crisis by upholding the spe-
cific right of Hungarian people to a government responsive to their
national aspirations and dedicated to independence. 250
The claim of a minor state to exercise its right of self-deter-
mination, that is, the claim to control the allocation of those values
which primarily affect its internal public order, might conflict with
the claim of a major power to use force for protection of its security
or with a regional claim to use force to maintain homogeneity of
ideology in all states within that region. Thus, the pertinent ques-
tions are whether international law can protect these diverse and
often competing claims, or whether some exceptions must be made
to the principles of self-determination and sovereign equality. Spe-
cifically, in the context of the western hemisphere, aims and aspira-
247 The Representative of Chile had called for the convocation of the meeting. See 52
DEP'T STATE BULL. 739 (1965).
248 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, provides: "The Organization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Of course, compliance with the
principle of "Sovereign Equality" should not be equated with some mythical equality
of nation states to be reflected in the authority structures at the United Nations, or
with equality in their influence in the international arena.
24 9 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, dealing with the purposes of the United Nations,
especially mentioning "self-determination of peoples" as a principle to be respected
in developing "friendly relations among nations." For the General Assembly resolu-
tions on non-intervention, see 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 128-29 (1966); 56 id. at
32-33 (1967) (Res. 2160 (XXI) ). See also Morgenthau, To Intervene or Not
to Intervene, 45 FoR'N AFF. 452 (1967).
2" U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 2D EMER. Sass., Supp. No. 1, at 2 (A/3355) (1956)
(United Nations Resolution on Hungary condemning the Soviet action).
1967
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tions of "democracy" imbedded in the OAS Charter,2 5' Rio Treaty,2" 2
and declarations of the OAS Conferences,253 might conflict with the
251 The Preamble of the Charter of the Organization of American States reads in part:
"Confident that the true significance of American Solidarity and good neighborliness
can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of demo-
cratic institutions .... 119 U.N.T.S. 50 (1952). For revenue to democracy in the
OAS Charter, see Article 5(d). Compare Article 13. See U.N. SEcuRITY COUNCIL
OFF. REc. 20th year, 1219th meetting 3-4 (S/PV.1219) (1965) (Cuban Representa-
tive's comment) ; id. at 4, where the Cuban Representative said that vague political
ideas on democracy contained in the OAS Charter "do not insure their practical imple-
mentation by means of a legal obligation to organize in a certain manner."
252 The Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance reads in part:
"That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that ... peace
is founded on ... the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of
justice and security ...." 21 U.N.T.S. 95 (1948).
253 See, e.g., the Resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation at its Third
Plenary Session, on May 6, 1965, to establish the Inter-American Peace Force, which
says in part:
[T~he Organization [OAS] is under even greater obligation to safeguard
the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situa-
tions such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate meas-
ures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal
democratic conditions.... (Emphasis added.)
OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Report of the
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States regarding the Dominican
Situation, Activities from April 29, 1965, until the installation of the Provisional
Government 7 (Pan Am. Union, 1965), OAS OFF. REc. OEA/Ser. F/11.10, Doc.
405, at 8, the resolution provides in its operative paragraph 2 that the Inter-American
Peace Force
will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of
cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican
Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and
concilation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.
(Emphasis added.)
See also Special Consultative Committee on Security, Report of the Special Consulta-
tive Committee on Security on the work done during its Fourth Regular Meeting,
April 12 to May 7, 1965, OAS OFF. Rac. OEA/Ser. L/X/118, at 19 '(1965), the
section entitled The Need to Defend Democracy. id. at 19-20:
In the Americas, under the protection of democratic freedoms, communism
has successfully developed and has used with impunity all the techniques of
revolutionary warfare preached by Lenin.... As a basic measure of self-
defense, the communist problem must be erradicated [sic] in order to carry
out the reforms demanded by the peoples of the Americas.
Id. at 18:
In the opinion of the Committee, the events that have occurred in the
Dominican Republic should be the object of a careful investigation with a
view to clarifying their relation to international communism. If such a
relaitons exists, it would be one more proof of the grave danger that threat-
ens the Americas.
The Committee reported at its Fifth Regular Meeting, October 18 to November 10,
1965, OEA/Ser. L/X/II10, at 4-5:
The events that began last April in the Dominican Republic, gave rise to a
typical case in which the communists attempted to take advantage of an
irregular internal situation in order to seize power. This maneuver was not
successful owing to the adoption of extraterritorial measures ....
Later, by means of a well-directed foreign plan, the communists took ad-
vantage of a series of circumstances such as ... the democratic opinion of
the Americas which favored the principle of nonintervention.
See id. at 15 ("In the Western Hemisphere, the position of the member states of the
OAS is in favor of the survival of democracy as is clearly expressed in its basic
documents.") ; id. at 36 ("As long as the present communist regime remains in
power in Cuba, the immediate threat of communism will continue in the Americas.") ;
id. at 16 ("Thus, it is essential that, for the purpose of strengthening and defending
democracy in the Americas, all the available means be applied for eradicating com-




decision in a Latin American country of a majority of its people to
live under non-democratic institutions. The United Nations Charter,
it may be noted, does not outlaw non-democratic governments or even
disapprove of them.
It is recommended that in the case of conflicting claims between
a regional organization and a state, pertaining to the state's right of
self-determination, an authoritative procedure should be established
by which the rest of the community can evaluate a region's policies,
vis-a-vis a state's right of self-determination, 2 4 to determine the per-
missibility or impermissibility of the limitation imposed by the region.
Furthermore, in case of conflicting claims between major and minor
powers, one possible solution would be for the community decision-
maker to recognize the capacity of major powers to cause deprivation
of values to other states and hence to accept "harsh realities" and
adopt and apply different standards to different participants in the
international arena. If this would not be a desirable solution, the
alternative would be for major powers to show restraint and volun-
tarily comply with international law norms. In this context, legal
adviser Meeker has made an encouraging statement in his recent
comment on the Viet-Nam controversy. He observes that:
We may feel the absence today of a law-giver outside national gov-
ernments, who could... give and enforce law among the nations.
That absence does not relieve us of moral and political obligation.
.. Let us remember, too, that the shape of things to come is in no
small way determined by the actions of great powers ... as we
consider the needs and the possibilities for developing effective
world law.25
5
The United States action in the 1965 Dominican conflict cannot
be said to have created a healthy precedent to strengthen inter-
national law. In the world of Nassers and Sukarnos, Duvaliers,
Stroessners and Somozas, amidst the tumultous outcry of such slogans
as "wars of national liberation" to justify the use of force, in the
presence of the still unresolved colonial conflicts and still more
threatened conflicts on the emotionally charged issue of apartheid,
and finally, in view of the inadequacies of international law - both
substantive norms and procedural safeguards - it becomes more
difficult and yet more compelling for a state to comply with law.
As the discussion in this paper indicates, the United States' action
detracted from strict compliance with law. It is in the interest of the
United States and the rest of the world community to strengthen
254 Cf. Plank, The Caribbean; Intervention, When and How, 44 FOR'N AFF. 37, 41-47
(1965). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1967, p. 18, col. 3 (city ed.), for a brief
report on the defeat of the Argentine proposal to institutionalize the Inter-American
Defense Board as part of the formal structure of the OAS at the recent Buenos Aires
meeting. The voting was 11-6-3.
25 Meeker, Viet Nam and the International Law of Self-Defense, 56 DEP'T STATE BULL.
54, 57-58 (1967).
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the rule of law by substituting collective action for unilateral action,
and strict compliance with international law in its formative years,
for expediency.
